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SYLLABUS

Federal health and safety regulations have saved or improved the lives of
thousands of Americans, but protecting our citizens from risk entails
significant costs. In a world of limited resources, we must spend our
regulatory dollars responsibly in order to do the most we can with the money
we have. Given the infeasibility of creating a risk-free society, this paper
argues that a sensible cost-benefit, risk versus risk approach be taken in the
design of U.S. regulatory oversight policy. The goal should always be to
further the best interests of the nation, ratherthan to satisfy the narrow agenda
of powerful industry or political forces. This entails designing safety
regulations efficiently to maximize society's welfare, choosing the point where
their marginal benefits equal their marginal costs-ratherthan simply asking
whether total benefits exceed total costs in the aggregate. Federal regulatory
oversight policy should also ask that proposed regulations compare the risks
they reduce to the new risks they unintentionally create (substitution risks).
Additionally, our citizens should be educated regarding systematic risk
misperceptions, and regulatory agencies should make their risk assessments
objectively. Moreover, most-likely scenarios must be addressedby responsible
regulatorysolutions, ratherthan the currentpractice offocusing on worst-case
estimates. Finally, agencies should publish and justify their regulatory
triggers and perform ex-post evaluations of their programs in an attempt to
continuously improve the quality of regulatory design.
Efforts by the executive branch,from Presidents Ford, Carter,Reagan and
Clinton, have attempted to inject similar common sense into the regulatory
oversight process. Unfortunately, the Congressional mandates given to
government agencies are often silent on the subject of cost-benefit analysis,
and recent Supreme Court cases have held that regulatory agencies are not
obligated to even consider the costs of their proposals. I will explore several
legislative reform bills that are aimed at overriding Congressional mandates,
but to date, none have been successful.
Finally, this paper will address certain common criticisms to which a
marginal cost benefit, risk-risk approach to responsible regulatory reform
would be subject. Most notably, the measurement of costs and benefits is not
an exact science, and using "willingness to pay" as a marker of individual and
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social utility has its limitations. Regulatory reform also faces challenges on
moral grounds, as scholars openly decry the explicit tradeoff between human
lives andfinancial resources. While these criticisms contain merit, this paper
concludes that to ignore a sensible cost-benefit analysis of federal safety
regulations is to divert resourcesfrom their most beneficial uses and to settle
for second best. In a world of scarcity, we must make regulatory tradeoffs as
efficiently as possible in order to do the greatestgood for the greatest number,
and to save the most lives we can. It would be unethical to do anything less.
INTRODUCTION

"We live in a world of limited resources." "We can't place a dollar value on
protecting human life or preserving our environment." Neither statement taken
independently strikes the reader as particularly controversial-they both seem
perfectly reasonable. Yet there is an inherent and unmistakable tension
between the two, for no society has unlimited resources to devote to the
protection of human health and the creation of a risk-free world.' The
questions become: Is it possible to balance the common sense concept of
scarce public resources with our deep moral aversion to placing a dollar value
on saving human lives? And, more importantly, how do we do it?
We would like to be able to protect every citizen from every harm in our
society, but most understand this is neither possible nor financially feasible.
Federal environmental and safety regulations aimed at preventing harm have

yielded tremendous benefits, but they carry staggering costs--on the order of
half a trillion dollars annually! 2 However, despite this reality, there is a
startling disconnect between common sense notions of maximizing the effect
See W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1423, 1424 (1996)
(noting that if all our resources were allocated to preventing accidental deaths, there would
be nothing left to promote other aspects of social welfare); Thomas 0. McGarity, A CostBenefit State, 50 Admin. L. Rev. 7, 38 (1998) (citing to statement of Frederick L. Webber at
the Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Affairs, 104th Cong. (1995): "no society
has unlimited resources to devote to protecting health and environmental quality").
2 See Thomas D. Hopkins, Costs of Regulation: Filling the Gaps, Report prepared for
Regulatory Information Service Center 2 (August 1992) (summarizing annual cost of
federal regulation for 1977, 1988, 1991 and 2000); Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing
Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure of Agencies to Comply With Executive Order
12866, 23 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 859 (2000) (noting that "regulations aimed at protecting
health, safety, and the environment alone cost over two hundred billion dollars annuallyabout two-thirds as much as outlays for federal, non-defense discretionary programs. Yet
the economic impacts of federal regulation receive much less scrutiny than the budget").
Viscusi et al. estimate that total annual regulatory costs in America are approximately $500
to $600 billion. W. Kip Viscusi, John M. Vernon & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Economics of
Regulation and Antitrust 34 (2d ed., MIT Press 1995). More dramatically, the regulatory
cost per household in 1994 was roughly $5,935, a far from trivial figure that when
aggregated across America amounts to nearly 10% of the nation's gross domestic product.
Id.
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of scarce resources and of actually putting that notion into practice in carrying
out U.S. regulatory programs. 3 Hypothetically, would it be worth tens of
millions of dollars to save one person's life if President Bush were to tighten
arsenic standards in drinking water to the level proposed by President Clinton
in his last days in office? 4 Or would that same money be better spent if it
could save thousands of lives by providing subsidized food and prenatal care to

3 Federal regulatory agencies have long resisted efforts to require a cost-benefit analysis
of their proposed regulations, relying on the absence of such a requirement in the
Congressional mandates establishing their mission. For instance, the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970 provides that the objective of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration ("OSHA") is "to assure so far as possible [that] every working man and
woman in the Nation [have] safe and healthful working conditions." 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)
(1994). The Act also requires that the tasks imposed by OSHA regulations be "feasible,"
but there is nothing establishing any relationship between the benefits derived from the
regulation and the costs imposed on society. See Viscusi, supra n. 1, at 1427. Moreover,
the Supreme Court has expressly held that OSHA is not required to use cost-benefit
balancing as a decision criterion in promulgating occupational health standards. See Am.
Textile Mfg. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 506-22 (1981) (holding that OSHA is not
required to use cost-benefit balancing as a decision criterion in promulgating occupational
health standards, but rather feasibility analysis, according to the text of the statute and the
legislative history). The Court ruled the same way with respect to EPA regulations
governing air quality standards, stating that cost considerations need not be considered
under the Clean Air Act since the legislation itself imposes no such requirement. See
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns., 121 S. Ct. 903, 909-11 (2001) (interpreting the Clean Air
Act as "unambiguously" barring cost considerations).
I Three days before leaving office in January of 2001, President Clinton proposed a
change in maximum arsenic levels tolerated in public drinking water. The Clinton
regulation would tighten the allowable arsenic level from 50 parts per billion (ppb) to 10
ppb. See John Heilprin, Environmental Group Sues EPA, Associated Press (June 28, 2001)
(available in 2001 WL 24030069) (stating that President Clinton announced the 10 ppb
standard three days before leaving the office in January). However, no cost-benefit analysis
of this tightening was conducted, and President Bush suspended the standard until February
2002 in order to allow further study of the risks involved at various levels of arsenic
exposure. At a minimum, one would think it sensible to engage in a calculation of the
number of lives saved by requiring safer drinking water, compared to the costs of making
our water that much cleaner. In addition to direct costs involved in purifying water, those
costs should also include any injuries or deaths that could possibly occur in the construction
of new, cleaner water wells, especially in western states where naturally occurring arsenic is
present in higher levels. This reasoning is implicit in new EPA head Christine Todd
Whitman's decision to ask the National Academy of Sciences to study the risk factors
involved in setting the standard at anywhere from 3 ppb to 20 ppb. See id. (stating that
Whitman announced that the EPA will set a new arsenic standard for communities to
comply with starting five years from now and that she asked the National Academy of
Sciences to study the risk factors involved with setting the standard anywhere from 3 ppb to
20 ppb). However, the Senate and House of Representatives recently voted to overturn the
Bush administration decision to study the matter further, effectively instituting the 10 ppb
standard. Infra n. 166 (discussing recent Senate and House vote).
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low-income mothers and free vaccinations to their babies? If we allocated all
our resources to preventing accidental deaths in one area, we would have
nothing left over to spend to prevent cancer or to provide food, housing or
5
medical care.
To a large degree, the problem is one of public perception. No politician
wants to admit that "we can't save that elderly person's life or institute a
proposed environmental protection program, because it will simply cost us too
much money to do so."' 6 Yet, this cost-benefit rationale is inherent in countless
personal decisions made everyday, from what career to pursue to what city in
which to reside. Similarly, in the regulatory arena, fiscal balancing of the costs
against the benefits should play a role in responsible decision-making. The
tradeoff between costs and results is always present, but we are sometimes
gripped by a fear that prevents us from acknowledging it openly. This
reluctance limits us as a society because it diverts resources from where they
are most needed. Even worse, this diversion is not based on a well-articulated
reason, but rather on a fear of the repercussions experienced by those who
voice such opinions. For instance, can you imagine a Presidential candidate
who said on election-day eve, "I want to do the greatest good for the greatest
number, and that means I choose not to help you." Not likely.
This paper proposes that given the reality of limited public resources,
America must efficiently reformulate its environmental and health regulatory
policies in order to save and improve the most lives possible given the
accompanying costs. This is not always going to be politically correct. It
entails making tough choices and preferencing certain programs and policies
over others, which necessarily implies that some causes will be sacrificed for
the greater good. But I urge that given our reality, society must consider
carefully how best to structure federal regulatory oversight policy-not how to
make it perfect. Perfection is dangerous precisely because it cannot ever be
achieved. This paper therefore concentrates on how to efficiently formulate
government regulations under the constraint of limited resources, in the hope
that such an approach will maximize the overall benefits to our society.
In pursuit of optimal regulatory policy then, Part I of this paper will examine
the framework of the problem that regulatory programs face in the United
States. Congress is justly empowered to legislate and regulate to promote the
health and safety of Americans where the unfettered market fails to do so.7
See Viscusi, supra n. 1, at 1424.
6 In the healthcare arena, this dilemma is illustrated most vividly by the rise of managed

care and the tension that HMOs create between providing medical care and saving financial
resources. Although the goal of healthcare providers has traditionally been to save lives-at
whatever expense-managed care has introduced financial incentives for physicians to limit
care where the benefits are small compared to the costs. See Steve P. Calandrillo,
Corralling Kevorkian: Regulating Physician-Assisted Suicide in America, 7 Va. J. Soc.
Policy & L. 41, 72-80 (1999) (explaining that managed care has introduced financial
incentives for physicians to limit care when benefits are small relative to the costs).
7 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, clause 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To... provide for
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Thus, the first line of inquiry when considering any safety regulation should be
to ask: "What is the market failure or externality that justifies federal
regulation in the first place, and how can government solve it?" Assuming that
regulation is required, we must carefully consider what society's overall
objective should be. Rather than serving powerful forces in industry or
government, federal health and environmental regulation should always seek to
promote our nation's and citizens' best interests. 8 We must also be mindful of
the fact that even where the unregulated market fails to work efficiently, that
does not necessarily mean we are going to witness a perfect form of
intervention from the federal government. 9
Part I takes up the abstract question of designing regulations efficiently,
initially discussing the infeasibility of creating a risk-free society. It then
details the various measures of economic efficiency that society might
collectively pursue,' 0 from narrow wealth-maximization (Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency) to measures that concentrate far more on distributive justice
concerns, such as Pareto efficiency, Rawlsianism, and equalitarianism." I
argue that in our pursuit of "efficient" regulatory solutions, overall wealth
maximization should and will be balanced against equity considerations and

the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States ....). Congress does not
usually draft specific regulations but instead defines broadly the legislative objectives of
regulatory agencies. The agencies then implement these goals subject to deferential judicial
review and the review process of the executive branch. Viscusi, supra n. 1, at 1426.
8 See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgt. Sci.
3 (1971) (warning against potential abuses stemming from industry or interest group
"capture" of regulatory agencies and stating that "as a rule, regulation is acquired by the
industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit"). Cf Eric A. Posner, CostBenefit Analysis as a Solution to a Principal-AgentProblem, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 289 (2001)
(casting American government as a principal-agent example, with agent subject to third
party political pressures that can affect the agent's actions with respect to its responsibilities
to the principal); Jefferson D.E. Smith & Steve P. Calandrillo, Forward to Fundamental
Alteration: Addressing ADA Title II Integration Lawsuits After Olmstead v. L.C., 24 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Policy 695, 716-18 (2000) (discussing public choice theory and the capture of
state legislative bodies).
I See Charles Wolf, Markets or Governments: Choosing Between Imperfect Alternatives
171-77 (MIT Press 1993) (developing a framework for analyzing and anticipating the
shortcomings of government. The framework-a theory of nonmarket failure-provides a
basis for comparison and choice between markets and governments.).
10Economists have devised many ways to measure economic efficiency and social
welfare. Generally, the term "economic efficiency" refers to the principle of wealthmaximization, also known as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See Richard A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law 13-14 (4th ed., Little Brown 1992) (stating that many economists use the
Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency). Many other forms of measuring social welfare exist,
including Pareto efficiency, Rawlsianism, and equalitarianism. For a discussion, see infra
Part II.B.
II See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economics of the PublicSector 52-69 (1986).

2001]

RESPONSIBLE REGULATION

"soft" variables such as concern for the well-being of our environment. 12
Utility calculations necessarily build in the value that people derive from these
variables, and hence, society's taste for fairness, morality, and distributional
equity are not omitted.
Part IM of this paper outlines an alternative regulatory approach for
America, proposing a sensible cost-benefit, risk versus risk approach to easing
the tension between scarce public resources and the deontological value of
protecting human lives. In analyzing this tradeoff, we as a caring, thoughtful
society should require a cost-benefit analysis of all potential government
regulation, 13 whether it is aimed at making our environment, air, water, food,
or workplace safer. 14 I take this cost-benefit notion one step further than most
12 Harvard Law School Professor Christine Jolls, for example, has argued that society

should and does care about more than just economic efficiency in the narrow sense, as
distributive concerns matter as well. Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of
Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1653, 1654 (1998) (analyzing distributive
legal rules). For instance, it might maximize overall social wealth to choose to give an extra
$1 billion to Bill Gates instead of giving $900 million to the poorest members of society.
Certainly, however, most people's taste for distributive justice, fairness, and equity would
lead them to derive greater utility from aiding the poor before the rich. Moreover, the
marginal utility of $1 to a poor person is usually significantly greater than the marginal
utility obtained from that same dollar in the hands of a wealthy individual. Posner, supra n.
11, at 458.
11 Traditional cost-benefit analysis is generally defined as the "identification,
measurement and comparison of the costs and benefits of a project in order to decide
whether or not it should go ahead." See John Sloman, Economics 312 (4th ed., Pearson
Educ. 2000).
14 Existing regulations governing these areas include: the Clean Air Act of 1955, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994) (making the EPA's mission to "protect and enhance the quality
of the Nation's air resources"); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1994) and the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j26 (1994) (addressing concerns about pollution of water resources and the quality of water
used for human consumption); the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301-395 (1994) (establishing the Food and Drug Administration to "promote the public
health by promptly and efficiently reviewing clinical research and taking appropriate action
on the marketing of regulated products"); and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994) (declaring Congress' goal to "assure so far as possible
every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions").
Despite the fact that these legislative mandates make no mention of cost considerations,
the executive branch has in fact attempted to institute sensible cost-benefit requirements for
U.S. regulatory programs in the past. See infra Part IV.A (discussing executive oversight of
U.S. regulations, as found, inter alia, in Reagan's Executive Order No. 12291, Clinton's
Executive Order No. 12866, and the role that the Office of Management and Budget
("OMB") plays in evaluating federal regulatory policy). However, precisely because the
legislative mandates are silent on the subject of cost-benefit analysis, our courts are often
unable to enforce such a common sense approach to regulation and occasionally prohibit it
outright. See Am. Trucking Assns., 121 S. Ct. at 908-09 (declining to read consideration of
costs into Clean Air Act authorization of enforcement by the EPA).
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commentators by suggesting that not only should overall costs and benefits of
potential programs be evaluated, but that government agencies must act to set
the appropriate regulation at the level where marginalbenefits equal marginal
costs.' 5 Setting our regulatory triggers at this point will have a far greater
impact on improving overall social welfare than an absolute cost-benefit
comparison would. Most everyone in society should favor a form of regulation
that maximizes the benefits minus the costs, and not one that merely asks
whether the benefits exceed the costs in the aggregate. 16
Beyond marginal cost-benefit analysis, Part III articulates several additional

proposals for improving the quality of U.S. regulatory programs. First, federal
safety regulations should assess substitution risks created. This process,
sometimes referred to as "risk-risk"' 7 or "health-health"' 8 analysis, simply
means that the risks unintentionally created by the imposition of a new
regulation should never outweigh the risks reduced or alleviated by that
regulation. 19 Additionally, we must strive to eliminate the extreme risk
11The difference between simple cost-benefit analysis and marginal cost-marginal
benefit analysis will be outlined infra Part III.B.
16For example, it might make sense to limit arsenic levels in drinking water to 10 ppb
instead of the current 50 ppb because it is economically feasible to do so, and the payoff in
terms of human lives saved is significant despite the costs. But, it might also make sense
not to continue tightening the arsenic standard from 10 ppb down to 3 ppb if the costs
increase exponentially in that next interval with only a small benefit to human quality of
life, even if overall benefits to society continue to be greater under a 3 ppb standard than
under the current 50 ppb standard. This logic is implicit in EPA director Christie Todd
Whitman's decision to ask the National Academy of Sciences to study the risk factors
involved in setting the standard at anywhere from 3 ppb to 20 ppb. See Heilprin, supra n. 4.
17See generally Lester Lave, The Strategy of Social Regulation: Decision Frameworks
for Policy 15-17 (Brookings 1981) (stating that the risk-risk framework allows consideration
of beneficial health effects along with adverse health effects).
18See Cass R. Sunstein, Health-HealthTradeoffs, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1533, 1535 (1996)
(raising problem of diminishing one health risk but, as a result, increasing another health
risk).
19Viscusi et al. note the hypothetical example of an automobile safety regulation that
requires car owners to return to the dealer where they purchased their vehicle in order to
receive a very minor, but government mandated, repair. Since all driving involves some
degree of danger, if the admittedly small risk created by requiring owners to drive the
distance to their dealer is greater than the minor safety benefits produced by the regulation,
society would be better served not to impose it. Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 705.
Additionally, in the context of regulating arsenic levels in drinking water, George Will notes
that the proposed Clinton standard might increase costs so much that people will be forced
to dig their own wells, thereby increasing their exposure to arsenic in the soil. The
possibility of these unintended consequences must be considered before implementing any
regulation. George Will, Sacramento Bee, Sacbee Voices, The Costs of Moral Exhibitionism
<http://www.sacbee.com/voices/national/will/will-20010415.html>
(Apr.
15,
2001)
("[T]here are unanticipated consequences.... [I]n rural jurisdictions with small tax bases,
the Clinton standard might have increased water costs so much that people would have dug
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conservatism that has plagued projections of the costs and benefits of safety
regulations in the past. Such "worst-case scenario" estimates lead to grossly
distorted outcome predictions and may cause regulations to fail to respond
appropriately to the true risks presented. 20 The Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"), for example, at one time assessed the risk posed by air
pollution by defining the upper bound as the risk to a person who lived twentyfour hours a day for seventy years at the location expected to receive the
heaviest concentration of the pollutant!2' Our risk assessment policies must

instead seek to address most-likely scenarios, drawing upon independent,
unbiased sources of scientific data. 22 Furthermore, the government must
educate our citizens in order to correct societal risk misperceptions and biases,
as people tend to systematically overestimate the risks of terrifying (but low
probability) events23 and underestimate the chances of relatively common (but
very serious) risks. 24 Finally, government agencies should be required to

publish and justify their regulatory triggers and to perform ex-post evaluations
of their programs, in the hope that measurement of results provides a baseline

25
for continuous quality improvement.
Next, Part IV will discuss previous efforts of the executive and legislative
branches designed to achieve some of the regulatory reform goals proposed
above. Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan and Clinton have all introduced

notable programs and executive orders designed to improve the quality and
efficiency of U.S. health and safety regulations. 26 Reagan's Executive Order
12,291 was the first to require that agencies demonstrate that the benefits of
their own wells, thereby increasing their exposure to arsenic.").
20 See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation
48-50 (Harvard U. Press 1993) (discussing the effects of worst-case risk analysis). See also
Adam M. Finkel, A Second Opinion on Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky
Prescriptionsof Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 295, 334 (1994) ("The
assertion that current modes of risk assessment routinely produce results that are wildly
conservative, and the implicit message that such results are unscientific and undesirable, has
been repeated so often in the last several years that it has become somewhat of a mantra.").
21 McGarity, supra n. 1, at 22. This fictional person was called "Maximan," the man
who endured the maximum level of risk exposure conceivable.
22 Cf W. Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice: Regulating Health and Safety in the Workplace
160-61 (Harvard U. Press 1983) (articulating his argument for fostering market control of
job risks because firms' self-assessments of their job risks will be the most accurate).
23 Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 662. For example, Americans tend to overperceive the risk
of tornadoes, floods and even contracting botulism. Id. at 662.
24 Id. People underestimate the risks of relatively common tragedies, such as death from
cancer, heart disease and stroke. Id.
25 See Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 138-55 (discussing the country's past methods of
regulatory review and other initiatives).
26 See infra Part IV.A, for a discussion of Executive Orders No. 11821 (President Ford),
No.12044 (President Carter), No. 12291 (President Reagan), No. 12498 (President Reagan),
and No. 12866 (President Clinton).
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their regulations exceed their costs, provided that such a comparison was not
explicitly prohibited by the governing statute. 27 The Clinton administration
continued this policy in Executive Order 12,866, introducing more qualifying
language to allow for the common sense notion that not all costs and benefits
28
are easily quantifiable.
While the achievements made possible by executive oversight have been
notable, the success of regulatory reform proposals may also implicitly depend
upon rewriting the existing legislative mandates given to government agencies
by Congress. Often, the relevant statutory authority governing the mission of
U.S. regulatory agencies is oblivious to marginal cost-benefit assessments, or it
may even prohibit such comparisons outright. 29 For instance, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") is charged with assuring "so far
as possible [that] every working man and woman in the Nation [have] safe and
healthful working conditions. '30 This mandate ignores the fact that nothing
can ever be made 100% safe, and that extreme safety precautions necessarily
entail extreme costs.

Instead, the congressional mandates given to federal

regulatory bodies should require, or at a minimum, permit cost-benefit and
risk-risk tradeoffs to be made. Such an approach will empower courts to
enforce common sense notions about how to best allocate scarce public
resources in order to benefit a greater number of our citizens than we do today.
Modifying legislative mandates will also force regulatory decision-makers to
be accountable for the policy choices they make.
I will explore congressional proposals aimed at incorporating these
See Exec. Or. 12291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128-29 (1981) (requiring that regulatory action not
be undertaken, to the extent permitted by law, unless benefits outweigh costs).
27

See Exec. Or. 12866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1993) (stating that regulatory agencies must
consider both quantitative and qualitative measures of benefits and costs).
29 For example, the language of the Clean Air Act has been interpreted by courts to
prohibit consideration of economic feasibility in setting air quality standards. See Lead
Indus. Assn. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that the "administrator
was not required or allowed to consider economic or technological feasibility in setting the
air quality standards"); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns, 121 S. Ct. at 911 (holding
unanimously that the Clean Air Act allows the EPA to consider only public health in setting
national ambient air quality standards, rather than the cost-benefit analysis proposed by
industry challengers.)
3029 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1994). The Act also requires that the tasks imposed by OSHA
regulations be "feasible," but "nothing establishes any necessary relationship between the
benefits derived from the regulation and the costs imposed on society." Viscusi, supra n. 1,
at 1427. Moreover, the Supreme Court has expressly held that OSHA is not required to use
cost-benefit balancing as a decision criterion in promulgating occupational health standards.
See Am. Textile Mfg. Inst., 452 U.S. at 509. But cf Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am.
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642-52 (1980) (holding that OSHA must show that the
hazards regulated pose a "significant" risk to human health and are "reasonably necessary or
appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment," but leaving unresolved the costbenefit tradeoff issue).
28
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concepts, including H.R. 1022, the Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of
1995.31 H.R. 1022 would have overridden all legislative mandates to add a
cost-benefit assessment provision. 32 It would have required that benefits be
"reasonably identifiable" and "significant," 33 and that risk calculations be
scientifically objective and unbiased. 34 It also asked that agencies recognize
and incorporate analyses of substitution risks in their assessments of regulatory
policies. 35 In 1997, the Thompson-Levin regulatory reform bill took a step
back from this proposal, and ironically, its moderation may have caused its
downfall. 36 More recently, a number of regulatory reform bills have been
proposed, including the OSHA Reform Act of 1999, the Regulatory
Improvement Act of 2000, and the Air Quality Standard Improvement Act of
2000, which would have added a risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis
section to the Clean Air Act. 37 However, none have succeeded yet in
fundamentally changing the way regulatory agencies conduct their business.
In addition to these efforts, Part IV will explore several other ideas discussed
in recent American history to improve regulatory oversight programs. For
example, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer has proposed the creation of a
"civil service elite" group which would gather expertise on regulatory policy, 38
while others have suggested the implementation of regulatory budgets to help
control skyrocketing agency costs.3 9
The above proposals for improving federal regulatory oversight programs
"' H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. (1995).
32

Id. at § 103 (stating applicability of bill).

31 Id. at § 4(2) (defining "benefit").
34 Id. at § 102(1) (stating that a purpose of the act is "to present the public and executive

branch with the most scientifically objective and unbiased information concerning the
nature of health, safety, and environmental risks in order to provide for sound regulatory
decisions and public education").
35 Id. at § 105(4) (listing as a requirement for every assessment and regulation
promulgation a "significant risk characterization document").
36 Allan Freedman, Regulatory Bill's Moderation May Be Its Weakness, 55 Cong. Q.
2075 (1997). Other mid-1990s attempts at legislative reforms included the Superfund
Reform Act of 1995 and the Department of Energy Risk Management Act of 1995.
37OSHA Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 1192, 106th Cong. (1999); the Regulatory
Improvement Act of 2000, H.R. 3311, 106th Cong. (1999); the Air Quality Standard
Improvement Act, S. 2362, 106th Cong. (2000). The Air Quality Standard Improvement
Act would have applied to seventeen different types of regulations authorized under the
Clean Air Act, including national ambient air quality standards. Bass, Berry & Sims PLC,
ProposedFederal Bill Would Add Cost-Benefit Requirement, 12 No. 3 Tenn. Envtl. L. Ltr. 4
(April 2000) (available in WL 12 No. 3 SMTNENVLL 4).
38 See Breyer, supra n. 20, at 59-81 (proposing the creation of a group of elite civil
service workers with experience in health and environmental agencies, Congress and OMB,
and the creation of a small, centralized administrative group).
39See Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 41-42 (stating that "a frequent proposal has been to
replace the oversight process through a system known as a regulatory budget").
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have significant public support, for they are founded upon the utilitarian ideal
of maximizing overall social welfare. However, Part V acknowledges the
strong practical and moral resistance to explicitly considering the costs and
limits of society's resources against the value of human lives when formulating
public safety regulations. 40 First, accurately measuring the costs and benefits
that stem from a given regulation is a tricky task. Even if we can measure how
much a regulatory program costs per life saved, how do we convincingly
assign a numerical value to a human being's life in the first place? This
dilemma is complicated by the fact that regulatory programs must attempt to
value extremely small changes in risk level, rather than their complete
elimination. 4' Furthermore, can we assess a person's quality of life as opposed
to merely measuring the quantity of lives saved? And, what about the
problems of survey bias and of discounting these values for future effects?
Moreover, some have raised serious moral criticisms, openly deriding costbenefit analysis as incurably insensitive to the intrinsic value of life.42 As
Professor Douglas McClean has observed, to "assign ...value to such benefits
is to treat them as commodities when they really have a different kind of
value-a sacred value perhaps-and should be regarded as such.

' 43

He is not

the first scholar to criticize those who could possibly be crass enough to place
a dollar value on the saving of a human being's life. This moral resistance also
surfaces in the rhetoric of our politicians and in the language of our existing
federal regulatory legislation. Our policies often eschew cost-benefit analysis
as irresponsible and insensitive to the ultimate goal at hand, and instead opt for
41 See Martha Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit

Analysis, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 1005, 1032 (2000) (counseling against cost-benefit analysis on the
ground that the results reached may be subject to "serious moral wrongdoing"); Henry S.
Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard,29 J. Leg. Stud. 971, 984-85 (2000)
(arguing that cost-benefit analysis is unable to provide a standard for public choice because
it is unable to refashion aims in light of new information); Amartya Sen, The Discipline of
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 931, 945-46 (2000) (explaining that cost-benefit
analysis is limited because of signaling issues, such as distributional valuations and values
of externalities and interdependencies, and problems with valuing public goods); Lynn E.
Blais, Beyond Cost/Benefit: The Maturation of Economic Analysis of the Law and Its
Consequences For Environmental Policymaking, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 237, 249-50 (2000)

(arguing against overreliance on quantifying costs, benefits and risks because the value of
environmental protection cannot be measured in economic terms).
41See Lewis A. Kornhauser, On Justifying Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J.Leg. Stud. 1037,
1050-51 (2000) (describing difficulties inherent in valuing changes for the survival
prospects of human beings, rather than valuing a certain loss or saving of life). See also
Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 686-88 (discussing society's willingness to pay for eliminating
small probabilities of death or adverse health effects).
42 See Curtis Moore, The Impracticality and Immorality of Cost-Benefit Analysis in

Setting Health-Related Standards, I I Tul. Envtl. L.J. 187, 208-10 (1998) (decrying the use
of cost-benefit analysis as sole criterion in health regulation because, inter alia, the concept
of monetizing life is antithetical to American values).
13 McGarity, supra n. 1,at 63.
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a world that should be made as safe as possible-whateverthe costs may be.44
I am the first to agree that there are serious problems that would make any
marginal cost-benefit standard subject to potential manipulation and abuse.
But that does not mean we should not try to improve upon what we currently
have. The difficulty of measuring these values does not undermine the
principle that responsible regulatory programs should focus their efforts where
they can save the most lives given limited resources. We as a country would
be foolhardy to choose to ignore cost, benefit and risk tradeoffs merely because
of the difficulty in their assessment, because we would then be consciously
deciding to do something less than the best we can. Thus, despite the valid
concerns raised by critics, we must strive to conquer these problems if our
ultimate goal is the betterment of society and the maximization of scarce

resources.
Finally, we should bear in mind in conducting the foregoing regulatory
oversight analysis that it is a matter of common sense that people weigh costs
and benefits in making life decisions all the time. American businesses make
cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness calculations daily. While individuals are
understandably upset by public health and safety decisions that explicitly trade
45
off lives for dollars, no one really wants to spend everything on safety.
Policymakers should similarly be able to balance costs, benefits and risks
openly in America's regulatory oversight policy. The choice is not between
helping all of our citizens or helping none. Given limited resources, the
government can only help some. This paper is therefore intended to provoke
thought about how responsible, efficient regulatory policy can maximize the
number and the value included within that "some."
I.

WHY REGULATE AT ALL?

It is undisputed that Congress has the power to regulate in order to promote
the health of our citizens and safety of our environment. 4 6 It is with this noble
I Only a few months ago, the United States Supreme Court again echoed this aversion to
considering costs in its interpretation of the Clean Air Act, ruling that such expenses could
not be considered in the establishment of air quality standards. See Am. Trucking Assns.,
121 S.Ct. at 911-12 (holding that Congress required EPA to conduct feasibility analysis, not
cost-benefit analysis, in promulgating air quality regulations). While the principle of
placing safety above money is unquestionably noble, ignoring the costs of regulations
because we cannot face the reality of comparing them to the benefits created is not a
responsible decision. Resources that are spent unwisely or excessively in one area are
resources that are no longer available to benefit our country in numerous other more costeffective ways.
45Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis With the Principle That Safety
Matters More Than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 114, 116 (2001). Cf Viscusi, supra n. 1,at
1424 (adding that "if we allocated all of our resources to preventing accidental death, we
would have nothing left to spend to prevent cancer, or to provide food, housing, medical
care, and so on").
46 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, clause I ("The Congress shall have Power To ...provide for
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and paternalistic mission that Congress has enacted groundbreaking legislation
that has saved or improved the lives of thousands of Americans. 4 7 Before any
argument can be made about how to formulate optimal U.S. regulatory policy,
however, we must ask why any regulation is necessary in the first place.
A.

Market Failuresand Externalities

The traditional economist's answer to the question of "Should we regulate?"
might run along these lines: "Let the unencumbered market work to solve the
problems that are out there in society. Government regulation is not nearly as
efficient. '48 The basic idea is that if there is a problem with drinking water or
air pollution or food safety, concerned citizens will demand that the market
provide a solution. Consumers will be willing to pay higher prices in order to
ensure that the safety level of the products they buy meets their needs and
desires. Consequently, some might argue that there is no need for the
government to regulate arsenic levels in tap water at all-rather, concerned
consumers will ask for it, pay more money for it, and producers will deliver
what their customers desire.
This response is imperfect and overly simplistic. In many areas of public
life, market failures, negative externalities, and insurmountable transaction
costs exist that justify and require government intervention for resolution. 49
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States .... ").
" See e.g. the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994); the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994); the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994); the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994). See also
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Environmental Economics Report Inventory: The
Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act 1990 to 2010, EPA Report to Congress
<http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/copy99.html> (Nov. 15, 1999) (detailing effects of Clean
Air Act legislation, and finding that benefits significantly outweighed costs of regulation
entailed). Additionally, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration-part of the
Department of Transportation-estimates that Department of Transportation regulations
requiring airbags in vehicles have saved 4,011 drivers and 747 passengers between the date
of imposing the regulations and the end of 1999. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration,
Safety Fact Sheet <http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/airbags/factsheets/
numbers.html> (Nov. 2, 1999). Moreover, 100 lives were saved in eighteen months as a
result of Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC")-funded smoke alarm
installation and fire-safety education programs in thirty high-risk communities in fourteen
states. H.R. Subcomm. on Labor-Health and Human Services-Education Appropriations of
the Comm. on Appropriations, Hearing on Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Fiscal Year 2002 Presidential Budget Request, 107th Cong. (May 3, 2001) (available in
2001 WL 2007624) (Testimony of Jeffrey P. Koplan, Director of CDC).
48 See e.g. Sloman, supra n. 13, at 320-21 (explaining the arguments in favor of laissezfaire or non-market intervention). Sloman states that "government intervention in the
market can itself lead to problems ....
Although markets in the real world are not perfect,
even imperfect markets can be argued to have positive advantages over government
provision or even government regulation." Id. at 321.
"9 Viscusi notes that since the 1970s,
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"Market failures" are problems that, by definition, free markets are unable to
solve if left to their own devices. 50 Two of the most frequently discussed
examples are the "tragedy of the commons" and the "free-rider problem" in the
context of paying for public goods.
The prototypical tragedy of the commons dilemma involves a town
51
commons where all of the locals may graze their sheep and farm animals.
There is no private ownership of the commons; rather, it is free for everyone to
use as much as and as often as he or she likes. Unfortunately, given the
unbeatable price users are asked to pay, everyone has an incentive to use the
land as much as possible and as quickly as possible. This outcome would be
acceptable if the commons could replenish itself in perpetuity, but of course
that is not the case. Dramatic overuse inevitably results, stripping the land of
its resources until it is left barren and worthless. The commons would have
been far better utilized if sensible limitations were placed on the amount of
grazing in which townspeople could engage, such that the land could renew
itself and all could continue to benefit.
An economist might argue that private ownership would solve the overuse
problem, because a single owner would have an incentive to maximize the life
of and return from her land. Hence, she would charge a fee to users in order to
restrict use to the optimal level, which in turn would extend the life of the land
(and her profits) in the years to come. Alternatively, if public ownership
continued, the government could either charge an admission fee in order to
restrict use to the socially appropriate level, or it could set grazing limitations.
This kind of government regulation would place citizens' private incentives
and allowable actions in line with the greater public good. Hence, overall
social welfare would improve: Townspeople would either be required to
adhere to the grazing regulations, or if charged for admission, they would pay
the fee only if the benefit to their livestock exceeded the cost of grazing on the

there has been a tremendous growth in government regulation pertaining to risk and the

environment. These efforts have emerged quite legitimately because market processes
alone cannot fully address risk-related concerns. Without some kind of regulation or
liability, for example, firms lack appropriate incentives to restrict their pollution.
Similarly, when products or activities are extremely risky, if people are not cognizant
of the risks they face, the firms generating the hazards may not have adequate
incentives to issue warnings.
Viscusi, supra n. 1, at 1423.
50 See Sloman, supra n. 13, at 297 (giving various reasons why "in the real world
markets will fail to achieve social efficiency," and noting that, in any case, achieving social
efficiency is not the government's only goal). But cf Richard Zerbe, Jr., & Howard
McCurdy, The Failure of Market Failure, 18 J. Policy Analysis & Mgt. 558 (1999) (noting
the limitations of traditional market failure analysis, and explaining market failures from the
perspective of transaction costs instead).
5I For a general description of the tragedy of the commons, see Garrett J. Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1243 (1968) (explaining the tragedy of the
commons as a population problem with no technical solution).
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common. 52
While either government regulation or private ownership might solve the
tragedy of the commons, the use of regulation is particularly compelling in the
case of public goods and the free-rider problem.5 3 "Public goods" are defined
as those that benefit everyone, and for which it is impossible to exclude anyone
from enjoying the benefits. 54 The paradigmatic example is the maintenance of
a nation's military. 55 All citizens benefit, whether or not they believe in the
merits of creating and maintaining a military force. There is no enforceable
system in which one individual could "opt out" of military protection and
receive a commensurate and proportional tax refund. If the country went to
war, presumably that person would benefit from military protection just as any
other tax-paying citizen would. The only difference is that the conscientious
objector, unlike her neighbors, would enjoy the benefits without shouldering
any of the costs.
It is not difficult to see that most market systems would collapse if freeriding were allowable. If one knows that all of one's neighbors are
contributing to build a military force or to enhance environmental safety, one's
incremental contribution-or lack thereof-will do very little to change
whether or not the program gets funded and how good the program is. From
each individual's perspective, nobody wants to pay, preferring instead to freeride off everyone else's tax dollars (assuming there is no way of excluding the
non-payers from receiving the benefit of military protection). 56 Since everyone
has exactly the same incentive to refuse to pay, nothing gets accomplishedeven though all would have been better off making their modest contributions
and enjoying the security of knowing that their nation had adequate defenses or
that they were living in a safer environment.
The free-rider dilemma, like the tragedy of the commons, is caused at its
roots by a fundamental divergence between the private problem facing an
52 One should note that both private ownership or government intervention should prove
successful in curing the tragedy of the commons. Private markets, however, have far more
trouble solving the free-rider problem in the context of providing public goods; thus,
government regulation may provide the only realistic solution. See Edward M. Gramlich, A
Guide to Benefit-Cost Analysis 17-18 (2d ed., Prentice-Hall 1990) (discussing the problem
of free-riding, and noting that private market mechanisms for achieving a social optimum
theoretically exist but that a feasible system would be "very difficult to work out").
53 See Sloman, supra n. 13, at 299 (discussing external benefits to individual actions).
14 Id. at G-13 (defining public goods as "goods or services that have the features of nonrivalry and non-excludability and as a result would not be provided by the free market").
Gramlich, supra n. 52, at 17.
51 The preservation of air quality and the environment, however, also fits well.
56 See Sloman, supra n. 13, at 297 (describing externalities as side-effects of the actions
of producers and consumers); Gramlich, supra n. 52, at 17. Non-excludability of a good or
service simply means that it is impossible to provide it to one person without it then being
freely available to all others. Non-excludability is thus a key characteristic of public goods,
and it is a main reason why the market mechanism will not adequately provide for them.
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individual and the overarching problem facing society as a whole. Thus, the
key to solve it then is to align private incentives with optimal social incentives.
Sometimes allowing private ownership can alleviate these problems-indeed,
the tragedy of the commons is one of the foremost justifications for the advent
of private property rights in the first place. But private ownership is not a
universal panacea. Simply privatizing our military would not eliminate the
free-rider problem because no feasible method exists for excluding non-payers
from military protection. If we are going to have a military, all citizens will
benefit regardless of whether or not an individual citizen pays her share.
Likewise, there is no feasible manner of privatizing the environment in order to
keep our air or water clean. This is where government regulation must step in
and play a vital role. Taxes must be imposed on all citizens, forcing everyone
to contribute to the maintenance of the public good or the purification of our
environment, from which we all will benefit.
These simplistic economics examples are admittedly imperfect analogies to
the problems that federal health and safety regulations are designed to solve,
but they highlight the crucial point that market failures sometimes do occur
that require government intervention to remedy. We must not, however, lose
sight of the threshold issue: What is the market failure (or negative externality
or insurmountable private transaction cost) that justifies government regulation
in the first place? This question is critical because, if there is no market failure
present, it is a needless diversion of scarce public resources to impose costly
regulations on society.
Optimal regulatory policy must therefore focus on the principle that the very
justification for government intervention is the presence of an externality that
the market has failed to correct on its own. 57 In brief, "externalities" are any
benefits or costs caused by one party but borne by others. 58 If a factory
produces socially useful widgets but emits pollution that is not reflected in the
cost of the product, a negative externality is imposed on all of the people living
near the factory. The only way to reduce or eliminate such an externalityassuming the market cannot-is to shift the cost back to the polluter through
government regulation. In turn, the producer will continue to chum out
widgets, and customers will continue to buy them, only if their value
outweighs their cost. Similarly, if citizens are uninformed about the risks of
certain activities or systematically underestimate them so that the true costs are
not reflected in the price charged, a negative externality exists. 59 It is when

57 See Gramlich, supra n. 52, at 18-20 (discussing the justification of government
regulation based on the presence of externalities).
51 Sloman, supra n. 13, at G-6 (defining externalities as "costs or benefits of production
or consumption experienced by society but not by the producers or consumers themselves").
Externalities are sometimes referred to as "spillover" or "third-party" costs and benefits. Id.
19 See id. at 331 (stating that "there have been many cases of people causing
environmental damage without even realizing it, especially when the effects build up over a
long time"). For example, scientists failed to connect aerosol use with ozone depletion until
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markets fail because of these externalities that government regulation is
justified and required in our society in order to improve the welfare of all.
Conversely, if the market can remedy the externality effectively,
government regulation is not only unnecessary, but also imposes needless
costs. 60 These costs are on the order of a half trillion dollars annually, 6' a far
from trivial expenditure that necessarily diverts resources from other socially
valuable programs. Furthermore, Charles Wolf notes that even where the
market does not work efficiently, that does not automatically mean that we are
going to witness a perfect form of intervention from the federal government. 62

Regulations are subject to numerous inefficiencies, just as private markets

are. 63 Regulations are intended to change the behavior of people and industry,
but any imposed change of behavior carries with it the risk of distorting
preferences beyond what is socially optimal. 64 Furthermore, the introduction
of regulation creates a bureaucracy that inevitably imposes transaction costs
into whatever context is being regulated.
Thus, even in situations where markets indisputably do not work well, there
is no assurance that government intervention will succeed. On balance,
though, government regulation can and must play a vital role in society by
correcting market failures and mitigating negative externalities in order to
maximize our nation's overall welfare.
B.

Regulatory Objectives: NationalBest Interest, Regulatory Capture, and
Agency Discretion

Keeping in mind these concerns, and assuming a market failure exists that
justifies intervention, society must carefully consider the objectives that
regulatory programs are designed to fulfill. The primary purpose of U.S.
the 1980s. Id. Furthermore, "even when the problems are known to scientists, consumers
may not appreciate the full environmental costs of their actions." Id.
60 See Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 33 (noting sizable estimates of cost savings from
deregulation of the airline, trucking, and rail industries).
61 Id. at 34.
62 See Wolf, supra n. 9, at 17 (contemplating market failures and government's
inadequate responses to them). Wolf develops a framework for analyzing and anticipating
the shortcomings of government efforts to remedy market deficiencies in order to provide a
basis for comparison and choice between markets and governments. See generally Wolf,
supra n. 9.
63 These "dead weight efficiency losses" can disadvantage U.S. companies globally and
have external costs such as slowed economic growth and less new jobs. See McGarity,
supra n. 1, at 39 (noting that "proponents of cost-benefit analysis are fond of pointing out"
regulation-induced efficiency losses, since the "primary virtue" of cost-benefit analysis is its
ability to generate regulatory decisions that increase overall allocative efficiency).
64 See Albert L. Nichols & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Perils of Prudence: How
Conservative Risk Assessments Distort Regulation, 10 Reg. 13, 17-19 (Nov./Dec. 1986)
(describing the distortions in regulatory policy caused by the use of "conservative" risk
assessments).
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regulatory policies should always be to serve the nation's best interests by
eliminating market failures. Such a mission stands in stark contrast to the
discretion
perils presented by "regulatory capture" and the increasing judicial
65
granted to government agencies in charge of regulatory programs.
First, a regulatory objective that seeks to maximize the country's best
interests must necessarily be free of those who would use the regulatory arena
to enhance their own political desires. Whether it is an industry group that
seeks to lobby or influence an agency, or the President herself that desires to
appease a constituency, promoting self-interest at the expense of the national
interest must be avoided with vigilance. This is precisely the substance of
George Stigler's admonition that we must be cautious that "regulatory capture"
does not defeat our country's true objectives. 66 Regulatory capture occurs
when the voices of a powerful few unduly and improperly influence the
decisions made by the regulating agency. 67 Certain interest groups may alter
optimal regulatory priorities through active resistance in the courts or in
Congress. As a result, agencies risk being forced to take the path of least
resistance instead of establishing socially sound policies. 68 Agencies captured
by special interests are thus susceptible to introducing regulations that in
reality represent the interests of the group lobbying for them rather than of our
nation as a whole. 69
Needless to say, if regulatory capture is a persistent problem, the
fundamental purpose of government regulations is defeated. Rather than
correcting a market failure to achieve socially optimal results, we find
ourselves back in the same dilemma where private incentives dominate the
overall social problem. Such inefficient regulation does not do anyone a
service, except for the powerful causes that paid for it. Hence, American
policymakers need to design regulations that build in safeguards to ensure that
regulatory capture is not allowed to subvert the country's best interests through
inefficient or unwise government regulation. Ideally, the implementation of
cost-benefit and risk-risk analysis should help avoid such misallocation of
resources based on inappropriate private pressure. This type of reform would
promote the national interest by forcing regulatory decision-makers to
precisely identify the actual risks and effects of regulation, as opposed to

65 In the most recent visitation to the subject of agency discretion, a unanimous Supreme
Court held that the broad discretion that Congress gave the EPA did not amount to an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and that the EPA did not have to consider
costs at all in setting its air quality standards. Am. Trucking Assns., 121 S. Ct. at 912-14.
66 See Stigler, supra n. 8, at 3-4 (warning against potential abuses stemming from
industry or interest group capture of regulatory agencies).

67

See id.

68

See McGarity, supra n. 1, at 54 (acknowledging that cost-benefit analysis could reveal

more socially sound policies than those implemented in a "captured" environment).
69 See Stigler, supra n. 8, at 4 (discussing the impact that the oil industry has on
government petroleum import quotas).
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asking cynically, "which interest group cares more?" 70

Another potential limitation on the ability of federal safety regulation to
serve the nation's best interests is the increasing discretion granted to
government agencies in carrying out their policies. The seminal case on the
issue of agency discretion is Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council

("NRDC"). 7 1 There, the NRDC challenged EPA "bubble policy" regulations
stemming from the Clean Air Act. 72 The EPA construed the statute to allow
states to permit large firms to choose the most efficient way of reducing total
pollution output at their plants, rather than forcing each individual smokestack
to meet a certain standard. 73 The EPA defended its policies, stating that they
were a reasonable interpretation of the mandate given to the agency by
Congress. The Supreme Court agreed, ruling that as long as agency
regulations are rationally related to the directive that the governing legislation

sets, courts will not second guess whether such regulation was warranted nor
substitute their own construction of statutory provisions for that of the
agency.

74

The result in Chevron-that is, the sanctioning of EPA bubble policies-

75
was undoubtedly sound from a law-and-economics efficiency standpoint.
Some have criticized the holding, however, as verging upon granting nearly
unfettered discretion to regulatory agencies, leaving the judiciary with little
leverage to reign in unwise policies. 76 While some leeway is due to agencies

70

See Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 1059,

1064-73 (2000). Sunstein states that cost-benefit analysis can be an effective tool in helping
the public see more than just their small perspective on a large problem and that it allows
people to take into account previously unperceived tradeoffs. Further, when individuals
must evaluate their willingness to pay for a certain issue in conflict with other values, the
resulting value is different (and more accurate) than that obtained in isolation. Using costbenefit analysis early in the regulatory process would therefore help the public ascertain
whether certain regulations were in their best interests. Sunstein concludes that "a
government that could insulate itself from misinformed judgments could save tens of
thousands of lives and tens of billions of dollars annually." See id. at 1063.
71Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Chevron is widely cited for the principle that an agency is entitled to broad deference in the
regulatory policies it chooses to pursue. As long as the program is reasonably related to the
mandate given to the agency by Congress, the courts will not strictly review its wisdom or
appropriateness. Id. at 865-66.
72 Id. at 842 n. 7.
71Id. at 840. For some historical context of EPA bubble policies, see Robert W.
Crandall, Controlling IndustrialPollution: The Economics and Politics of Clean Air 83-84
(Brookings 1983) (describing EPA bubble policies).
74Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 865-66.
71For some time, economists and policy hawks have embraced bubble policies as an
effective way to reduce air pollution in society. See id.
71W. Kip Viscusi, Lecture (Harvard L. Sch., Cambridge, Mass., Feb. 3, 1998) (copy of
transcript on file with Boston University Law Review).
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because of their accumulated expertise in a given area, Congress and the courts
must be cautious not to open up such discretion to abuse. We cannot let
agencies hide behind the shield of administrative discretion if the policies they
implement do not serve that goal in the best manner possible.
Finally, related to both the issues of regulatory capture and agency
discretion, Eric Posner warns of the principal-agent problem inherent in the
structure of American government and regulatory design. 77 He assumes the
following scenario: The President as Principal (who chooses to maximize
either (1) social welfare or (2) her chances of reelection), and agency as Agent
(which chooses to maximize either (1) "mission-relevant" welfare or (2) the
agency head's private interests). 78 Posner raises legitimate fears that both
parties may suffer from tunnel vision in carrying out their duties in order to
maximize private gain, resulting in a misallocation of resources. 79 Cost-benefit
and risk-risk analysis, however, can serve as responsible monitoring
mechanisms by highlighting more clearly whether the President's or the
agency's actions maximize private interests as opposed to mission-related
welfare. 80 Using these tools helps provide a better understanding of the actual
tradeoffs created by agency regulatory programs, which can therefore make
these decision-makers more accountable to Congress and the public. 81
In the abstract then, it is clear that federal health and safety regulation will
sometimes be needed to correct market failures and externalities in our society.
This form of government intervention should always focus on our nation's best
interests and guard carefully against the potential pitfalls posed by regulatory
capture, unfettered agency discretion, and the principal-agent problem.
[I.

DESIGNING REGULATIONS EFFICIENTLY

Most reasonable observers agree that U.S. regulatory oversight policy
should serve the nation's best interests as a whole. The logical next step is to
affirmatively design federal health and safety regulations both efficiently and
77 See Posner, supra n. 8, at 290 (detailing the principal-agent model and suggesting it as

descriptive of American government).
78 Id. Posner also suggests that Congress could be the principal, in which case the
President would be an intermediary between agencies and Congress; or that the public
could be the principal, in which case the whole government would act as agents. Id. at 295-

96.
79 Id. at 291-94 (describing various pitfalls by which both principal and agent may risk

misallocating social resources).
80 See id. at 296-297 (stating that cost-benefit analysis can help principals evaluate
whether agents' performance is commensurate with principals' goals). Of course, costbenefit analysis can have the effect of actually limiting the discretion of the principle.
However, the clarification of policies and the assessment of related costs and benefits should
expose projects that are more in line with re-election goals than with improving social
welfare.
" See McGarity, supra n. 1, at 40 (listing as a virtue that cost-benefit analysis facilitates
public dialogue and accountability).
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responsibly to accomplish that purpose. 82
There has been significant criticism of past government efforts to regulate
safety risks for failing to meet this common sense goal. Regulatory agencies
have come under increasing scrutiny in the past two decades for eschewing the
principle of efficiency in favor of other objectives, 83 some of which border on
the surreal. For example, an OSHA inspector in the 1970s penalized a firm for
allowing its employees to work on a bridge spanning a riverbed without
wearing life jackets. The only problem with that regulatory sanction was that
the river below had long since dried up. 84 Somewhat more seriously, OSHA
continued to make regulations concerning ethylene oxide exposures in
hospitals more stringent, despite the fact that the last tightening had zero effect
on reduction of cancer risk.85 Similarly, OSHA continued to strengthen its
controversial cotton dust standard despite challenges that it was unduly
burdensome and failed to reflect an appropriate balance between benefits and
costs. 86 Finally, arsenic regulations governing workers in the zinc, lead and
copper smelting industries continued to be tightened by OSHA despite the fact
that the final tightening cost three times as much as the first but had no
appreciable health benefits. 87 Increasing costs without improving safety

benefits is indisputably inefficient. 88 Society must instead design regulatory
policies that efficiently minimize risk and maximize the amount by which their
benefits exceed their costs.

82 See Viscusi, supra n. 1, at 1423 (noting that the "presence of market failure creates a

potential role for government action, but this action must be well-conceived. A clearly
misguided and unduly burdensome regulation certainly would not be in society's best
interest even if it were intended to address a legitimate social problem").
83 See Viscusi, supra n. 22, at 2 (declaring that the "federal government's effort to
regulate job risks and other hazards has been fundamentally ill-conceived, in large part
because these regulations have not been based on principles for efficient policies.").
84 Id. at 11; Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 791-92.
85 See Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 667-68.
86 See Am. Textile Mfg. Inst., 452 U.S. at 508-12 (holding that OSHA is not required to
engage in cost-benefit analysis when promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or
harmful physical agents because the statute requires that such standards be set "to the extent
feasible"). The Supreme Court rejected imposing any cost-benefit test upon OSHA, and
asked only whether the regulation was "capable of being done." Id. Such an approach
stands in stark contrast to a more rational interpretation of economic feasibility-i.e., one in
which courts would ask whether an appropriate safety payoff was obtained from regulatory
costs.

87 See Viscusi, supra n. 22, at 124 (arguing that the cost of successive tightening of
arsenic exposure regulations for workers in the zinc, lead and copper smelting industries
"dwarfs any reasonable estimate of the value of life" and providing numerical data to
support this proposition).
88 See id. at 10 (stating that "the policies selected by OSHA only influence [the cost
incentives to follow regulations]; they do not otherwise alter market outcomes").
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The Infeasibility of a Risk-Free Society

As a preliminary matter, we must recognize that it is impossible to create a
zero-risk society. 89 Every activity that people engage in poses some risk,
despite best efforts to reduce the risk to negligible levels.90 At a certain point,
the further reduction of risk becomes practically impossible.
More
importantly, it almost invariably does not make sense for society to even
attempt to reach this point because of the prohibitive expense entailed.
For example, one might ask the question, "Should automobiles be made as
safe as possible?" 91 Many Americans might reflexively answer, "Certainly."
But, as George Will notes, the indisputably correct answer is, "Certainly
not!" 92 If Department of Transportation regulations required that cars be
designed to be "as safe as possible," they would have a maximum speed of
perhaps 10 or 15 miles per hour. They would be heavily protected and
reinforced in fuel-inefficient ways, and they would contain no radios or other
possible distractions. And, if safety were society's sovereign goal, "traffic
laws would include a ban on (among many other things) left turns, which are
risky.

89

' 93

Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 658-60 (discussing the infeasibility of a risk free society).

Cf Will, supra n. 19 ("Reasonable people do not talk about subordinating all values to any
single value, be it safety, health, freedom, virtue, even justice. 'Fiat justitia ruat coelum' (let
justice be done, though heavens fall)? Heaven forbid.").
90 For example, Viscusi details various activities, all of which increase one's annual
death risk by one in one million:
Activity
Cause of Death
Smoking 1.4 cigarettes
Cancer, heart disease
Drinking 0.5 liters of wine
Cirrhosis of the liver
Spending 1 hour in a coal mine
Black lung disease
Air pollution
Living 2 days in New York or Boston
Traveling 10 miles by bicycle
Accident
Traveling 150 miles by car
Accident
Flying 1000 miles by jet
Accident
Living 2 months in average stone or
Cancer caused by natural
radioactivity
brick building
Eating 40 tablespoons of peanut butter
Liver cancer caused by
aflatoxin B
Drinking Miami water for 1 year
Cancer caused by chloroform
Drinking 30 12-oz. cans of diet soda
Cancer caused by saccharin
Living 150 years within 20 miles of nuclear power plant
Cancer caused by radiation
Eating 100 charcoal-broiled steaks
Cancer from benzopyrene
Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 659.
91 Will, supra n. 19.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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Thus, when we regulate to decrease risk and increase safety in society, we
are really striving to create solutions that minimize risk to the socially optimal,
or efficient, level. We cannot regulate in a manner that would sacrifice all
values to those of safety and risk elimination. Rather, balancing competing
values efficiently is inevitable. 94
B.

Various Measures of Efficiency and Social Welfare
A great debate rages, however, over the definition of "efficiency." There
are many ways to measure it, many of which lead to varying results. If we
desire efficient regulatory solutions as our ultimate goal, their pursuit should
responsibly incorporate concerns for distributive justice and other "soft"
variables in addition to narrow wealth-maximization.
As a threshold matter, we must ask, "What does it mean to design a
regulation 'efficiently' such that it best serves our nation's overall interests?"
First, it should be made clear that seeking economic efficiency generally does
not mean that everyone will, or even should, be better off after a given
regulatory response to a market failure. Rather, the idea is to expand society's
overall "pie" so that more people are made better off and fewer people are
made worse off.
Economics scholars have devised several tools in the attempt to measure
economic efficiency and social welfare. 95 Among the most popular of the
various concepts is that devised by Nicholas Kaldor and J.R. Hicks. 96 KaldorHicks efficiency and the corresponding Hicks Compensation Principle
acknowledge that there will be "winners" and "losers" resulting from any
government regulation. 97 The relevant question is whether the gain to the
winners outweighs the losses to the losers such that the winners could

9' See Viscusi, supra n. 1, at 1424 (discussing how limited resources require that we
determine how far we should go in regulatory efforts as well as how we should choose
among them).
91 For a discussion of various efficiency and social welfare measurement tools, see
Stiglitz, supra n. 11, at 52-62, 66-69.
96 See generally Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositionsof Economics and Interpersonal
Comparisons of Utility, 49 Econ. J. 549, 549-52 (1939) (describing Kaldor's efficiency-

based method of measuring economic efficiency and social welfare); J. R. Hicks, The
Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 Econ. J. 696, 709-12 (1939) (describing Hicks'
"compensation"-based method of measuring economic efficiency and social welfare).
97 See Kaldor, supra n. 96, at 550 (noting that there "is no need for the economist to
prove-as indeed he never could prove-that as a result of the adoption of a certain measure
nobody in the community is going to suffer"); Hicks, supra n. 96, at 706.
Under private enterprise, any ordinary change in economic policy involves a change in
the price-system, and any change in the price benefits those one side of the market, and
damages those on the other. Thus [every simple economic reform will] always inflicts
a loss of some sort on some people.
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potentially compensate the losers and still be better off.98 If the answer to that
inquiry is yes, the regulation is deemed to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient. 99 Most
economists would say that society is "better off' with that regulation in place
because the size of the nation's overall pie has been expanded, even though
some people or groups are left worse off. When an economist refers to
"efficiency" or the fact that overall "social welfare" has been improved in this
manner, nine out of ten times they are referring to this concept of Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency. 100
Thus, in the regulatory context, striving for efficiency generally means that
the overall social welfare created by a federal safety regulation should be
greater than that existing before the government intervention.101 There is
always the problem, however, of how to measure the size of the pie in the first
place. Economists are famous for their adherence to a person's (or society's)
"utility level" to measure how well off they are. In turn, "willingness to pay"
is usually utilized as the marker of utility.10 2 Willingness to pay does serve this
purpose in the abstract because, presumably, the greater a person's willingness
to pay, the greater level of welfare they receive from the product (or the
regulation in this case).
By all accounts, however, using willingness to pay as an efficiencymeasurement criterion has serious drawbacks (many of which will be
discussed infra, Part V(2)). 10 3 In the regulatory context, it simply asks, "What
would a person be willing to pay to solve or reduce the risk of a given safety
hazard?" Or, one might look at the question another way: "How much would
someone pay in order to have (or avoid having) a government safety regulation
in a certain area?" One of the problems that immediately jumps out is that
individuals' initial positions in society (i.e., their income, their wealth, and

98 Stiglitz, supra n. 11, at 61.
99See id.
'0o Posner, supra n. 10, at 13-14.

101This expansion of social welfare occurs because the regulation presumably addresses
previously uncorrected negative externalities and reduces risks that society faces.
102 See Sen, supra n. 40, at 945 ("In mainstream cost-benefit analysis, the primary work
of valuation is done by the use of willingness to pay.").
103Nussbaum derides the construct of "willingness to pay" for failing to make "the
exclusionary moves that are by now common in the literature on social choice." Nussbaum,
supra n. 40, at 1029. For example, it does not omit "preferences based on ignorance and
haste, preferences deformed by malice, envy, resentment, or fear, and preferences that
reflect adaptation to a bad state of affairs that is thought to be the only one possible." Id.
Sen and Sunstein also question the concept. See Sen, supra n. 40, at 945-47 (discussing the
"basic limitations" of relying on the willingness to pay); Sunstein, supra n. 70, at 1088-91
(discussing various problems with willingness to pay). But cf Robert Frank, Why is CostBenefit Analysis so Controversial?, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 913, 925-27 (2000) (defending
willingness to pay as the best and most practical utility-measurement tool available if
conventional estimating procedures are amended.).
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whether or not they are already "endowed" with a given right 10 4) drastically
influence how much they are willing to pay for certain goods. A poor person
might highly value clean air and water but be unable (and therefore unwilling)

to pay very much to protect it.

Conversely, a wealthy individual might

subjectively care far less, though she can afford to pay more with relative
ease. 105
Beyond the obvious problems introduced by willingness to pay and the
endowment effect, there is far from uniform agreement that maximizing
overall social welfare by seeking Kaldor-Hicks efficient regulatory solutions is
the best measure of efficiency in the first place. 10 6 While the Hicks
Compensation Principle is a compelling criterion if the winners actually pay
out compensation to those made worse off, it loses some of its luster if we keep
it as only the potential to pay compensation. Why should some groups be
made better off at the expense of others and no compensation be made?
Thus, alternate measures of social welfare and efficiency have been
proposed that care far more about distributive justice, including the concepts of
Pareto efficiency, Rawlsianism, and equalitarianism. 10 7 The test of Pareto
efficiency would ask of a proposed regulatory policy, "Can this regulation be
designed in such a way that absolutely no one is made worse off, and at least
one person is made better off?"' 0 8 At first blush, this measurement tool seems
much less objectionable than the Kaldor-Hicks idea of "hypothetical
compensation" described above. Surely, no one could object to a regulation
that required that at least one member of society be made better off and that no

'04

The "endowment effect" refers to the divergence between the amount someone would

pay to "buy" a right and the amount at which the same person would "sell" that right if it
were already assigned to her. Often, an individual will ask for far more money in order to
part with a right than they would be willing to pay in order to obtain that right, although this
phenomenon seems somewhat irrational. See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and
Economics 87 (Scott, Foresman and Co. 2000).
105See e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. Leg. Stud. 191, 194-201 (1980).
Dworkin considers the following hypothetical example: Derek has a book that Amartya
desires. Derek is poor and sick and miserable, and the book is one of his few comforts. He
is willing to sell it for $2 only because he needs medicine. Amartya, on the other hand, is
wealthy and content. He is willing to spend $3 on the book, on the off chance that someday
he might read it, although he knows that he probably will not. An economist, or a "tyrant"
in Dworkin's example, might say that society is better off with the book in Amartya's hands
because he is willing to pay more ($3) than Derek is ($2) for the same book. However,
Dworkin and many others intuitively feel that such a world is not a better place in any
respect. This point has merit, and it gets directly at the problems of equity and distributive
justice under a narrow willingness to pay standard.
106 See Stiglitz, supra n. 11, at 52-62, 66-69 (describing efficiency and distribution
tradeoffs).
'07 See id.
08 See id. at 54 (defining Pareto improvements as "changes that make some better off
without making anyone worse off').
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one be placed in a worse position. True, there would be no losers to speak of.
However, it is almost impossible to imagine any regulatory program that
would not make at least one person or group worse off. In order to provide the
greatest good to the greatest number, it is virtually inevitable that someone is
asked to sacrifice. Thus, while Pareto efficiency is so powerful in its
requirement that no one be harmed in order to achieve an efficient solution, it
is that very power that drastically limits its application. 10 9 In order for society
to function and for regulations to serve our nation's best interests as a
collective whole, it is inevitable that some industries or individuals will be
made worse off in order to serve the greater good.
An alternative measure of social welfare that highly values distributive
justice has been proposed by John Rawls. 10 Rawlsianism is interested not in
the maximization of the nation's overall pie, but in the position of the worst-off
member of society."' 1 It asks, "If one did not know what her position in
society would be-i.e., one might be among the best off, or the absolutely
worst off member-what kind of a society would she choose to construct and
live in?" This is known as the Rawlsian "veil of ignorance." 11 2 The implicit
presumption is that because people justifiably care about fairness and equity,
and are also risk averse, they would choose a society that maximizes the
position of the worst-off member. 113 Hence, in the regulatory arena,
Rawlsianism would ask how a proposed policy affected the most
disadvantaged person or group, and not whether overall social welfare
increased in the aggregate.
Finally, an even more extreme position taken in addressing social welfare is
that of equalitarianism.114 Equalitarianism seeks the truest form of equity
between the worst-off and best-off members of society. It aims to minimize
inequality between those two individuals or groups by asking only how a
proposed change affects the divergence between them. For instance, if a
1o See Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner & Alvin E. Roth, The
Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 793, 800 (2000) (noting that the
Pareto standard is "notoriously limited in its usefulness, for rarely can one make some
people better off without making even a single person worse off"); Dworkin, supra n. 105,
at 193 (discussing problems with the concept of Pareto efficiency).
Ito See generally John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard U. Press 1971).
Id. at 14-15 (discussing the principle that "social and economic inequalities.., are
just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least
advantaged members of society").
"12 See id. at 136 (stating that in order to "nullify the effects of specific contingencies
which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their
own advantage... [we must] assume that the parties are situated behind a veil of
ignorance"). See generally id. at 136-42 (discussing concept of veil of ignorance).
113See id. at 183-92 (discussing how, assuming a veil of ignorance, parties will choose a
society that benefits its worst-off member because of the parties' aversion to risk and love of
mankind).
"'4See Stiglitz, supra n. 11, at 69 (describing strong equalitarianism).
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regulatory policy would have the effect of increasing the welfare of the richest
members of society by one million "utils"'1 15 and would increase the welfare of
the poorest members of society by 900,000 utils, the pure equalitarian would
reject such a proposal. Note that this regulation would be Kaldor-Hicks
efficient (because the overall pie increases), Pareto efficient (because no one is
made worse off), and Rawlsian (worst-off person made better off). However,
the mere fact that the divergence between the worst-off and the best-off
member of society increases is grounds for the policy's rejection, despite the
fact that both groups are made significantly better off.
Thus, in striving to design regulations efficiently, it is important to keep in
mind that several different measures of social welfare and efficiency have been
proposed and debated by economics scholars. 1, like most, generally opt for
the Kaldor-Hicks notion of wealth-maximization (with certain caveats) when I
speak of efficiency. It is that concept of maximizing overall social welfare that
regulatory policy should strive to achieve, for it intuitively feels closest to
serving our nation's best interests by seeking the greatest good for the greatest
number.
This is not at all to say that equitable, emotional and distributive justice
concerns should be ignored in our design of efficient regulations. Quite to the
contrary, these principles are a component of people's and society's utility
levels, and have been rightly raised by regulatory agencies like the EPA' 16 and
scholars such as Christine Jolls. 117 These "softer" variables are a part of the
inputs to our social welfare calculation and must be taken into account when
formulating optimal U.S. regulatory policy.1 18 Marginal cost-benefit tests,

115

A "util" is an imaginary unit of satisfaction derived by the consumption of a good,

and it is often used generically as a measure of a person's utility level. Sloman, supra n. 14,
at 92 (defining "util").
116 E.g. Lead Indus. Assn., 647 F.2d at 1153 (discussing the EPA's argument that air
quality standards should protect people who are particularly sensitive to the effects of
pollution and that the standards be set at a level at which there is "an absence of adverse
effect" on these sensitive individuals).
117See Jolls, supra n. 12, at 1654-55 (describing the tradeoff between distributive
objectives and efficiency).
18 See Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Legal: Three Rules, 17 J. Policy
Analysis & Mgt. 419 (1998) ("The values considered in benefit-cost analysis are very broad
and include those associated with income distribution .... ). The overall utility level that
society obtains from federal safety regulations must therefore encompass not just "hard"
monetary values for costs and benefits created, but it must place values on the utility that
people obtain from emotional considerations and from creating a more equitable society.
Valuing these "softer" benefits will prove difficult, but it must be done to give a fair and
accurate assessment of the benefits of regulation. Moreover, the principle of the
diminishing marginal value of wealth instructs us that there is less incremental benefit
obtained from improving the position of wealthier segments of society than that obtained
from the same magnitude improvement directed towards poorer segments of the population.
See Posner, supra n. 10, at 458-59 (applying the principle of diminishing marginal utility to
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risk-risk analysis and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency need not be oblivious to this
reality, as the utility that people derive from knowing that they can breathe
clean air, drink clean water, or create a fair and just world is a significant
component of overall social welfare. Thus, the costs and benefits resulting
from any regulation should factor in people's taste for these softer values.
True, these concepts are even more difficult to measure than "hard" costs or
benefits, but they are very real inputs into our calculus of what the country's
best interests truly are. 119
In summary, responsible regulatory programs should strive to ensure that
regulations are designed efficiently-after all, who would argue that we should
120
throw our resources away, or enact programs that do more harm than good?
The fact that there is certain to be continued debate on the definition of
efficiency or its inputs does not render its pursuit an unworthy goal. Rather,
most scholars and laymen generally agree that maximizing overall social
welfare and attempting to provide the greatest good to the greatest number
have merit.12 1 The key then will be to design a U.S. regulatory oversight
policy that addresses the valid concerns of critics by seeking to balance narrow
economic efficiency with softer variables in making society's cost-benefit
regulatory calculation.

the notion that "a transfer from a more to a less affluent person is likely to increase the sum
of the two persons' utilities"). See also Steven Shavell, Principles of Economic Analysis of
Law (forthcoming text) (manuscript on file with author) (Shavell argues that "satisfying
notions of morality affects social welfare by affecting individuals' utilities," but that this
point should be "distinguished from the assumption that morality notions have independent
importance, regardless of the degree to which they raise the utility of individuals.").
119In fact, these concerns were justly reflected in President Clinton's Executive Order
No. 12866-while keeping the substance of the cost-benefit assessment process that his
predecessors enacted, Clinton added language that provides for the inclusion of nonquantifiable regulatory benefit considerations. See infra Part IV.A.
120See Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 664 (arguing that once we step back from the debate
over costs and benefits, all observers would agree that society does not need or want policies
that are more harmful than beneficial).
121See Kornhauser, supra n. 41, at 1051-57 (pragmatically defending cost-benefit
analysis in light of the other feasible alternatives); Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 664 (arguing
that society should pursue policies that advance the nation's overall interests); Mathew D.
Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L.J. 165, 245 (1999)
(arguing that cost-benefit analysis is a "useful decision procedure and it should [with certain
exceptions] be routinely used by agencies); Sen, supra n. 40, at 950-52 (discussing the
general value of cost-benefit analysis, despite the fact that it is often misused); Steve P.
Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights, 9 Fordham Intell. Prop.,
Media & Ent. L.J. 301, 336-41 (1998) (arguing for a government-run reward system in lieu
of intellectual property rights in order to maximize overall social welfare and provide the
greatest good to the greatest number).
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AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO REGULATION

Assuming a general consensus that our government should attempt to design
health and safety regulations efficiently, I urge that America adopt a different
approach to regulatory oversight than that currently existing, in order to
accomplish this goal and maximize social welfare.
While several risk-reducing government regulations have indeed passed
sensible cost-benefit tests, 122 there are numerous examples of federal
regulations that have failed to do so. 123 For example, a proposed OSHA

John F. Morall III has compiled data regarding regulations that have easily passed
reasonable cost-benefit tests:
Cost per
Year & Status
Initial
Annual Life Saved
(F = final,
Annual
Lives
(millions
Regulation
P = proposed)
Agency
Risk
Saved
of 1984 $)
5
Unvented space heaters
1980 F
CPSC
2.7 in 10
0.1
63
Oil and gas well service
1983 P
OSHA-S
1.1 in 103
50
0.1
Cabin fire protection
1985 F
FAA
6.5 in 108
0.2
15
Passive restraints/belts
1984 F
NHTSA
9.1 in 10'
1,850
0.3
Underground
3
construction
1989 F
OSHA-S
1.6 in 10
8.1
0.3
Alcohol and drug control
1985 F
FRA
1.8 in 106
4.2
0.5
Servicing wheel rims
1984 F
OSHA-S
1.4 in 10'
2.3
0.5
Seat cushion
flammability
1984 F
FAA
1.6 in 107
37
0.6
Floor emergency lighting
1984 F
FAA
2.2 in 10'
5
0.7
Crane suspended
personnel platform
1988 F
OSHA-S
1.8 in 103
5
1.2
Concrete & masonry
construction
1988 F
OSHA-S
1.4 in 10'
Hazard communication
1983 F
OSHA-S
4.0 in 105
Benzene/fugitive
emissions
1984 F
EPA
2.1 in 10'
0.31
2.8
122

Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 700 (Table 20.4) (citing statistics of John F. Morall III, A
Review of the Record, 10 Reg. 25, 30 (Nov./Dec. 1986), and updating statistics up to July
10, 1990).
123 Numerous regulations have failed government regulatory agencies' own cost-benefit
tests:
Cost per
Year & Status
Initial
Annual Life Saved
(F= final,
Annual
Lives
(millions
Regulation
P = proposed)
Agency
Risk
Saved
of 1984 $)
4
2.1 in 10
Grain Dust
1987 F
OSHA-S
4
5.3
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regulation of formaldehyde exposure would have required an expenditure of
$72 billion per expected life saved. 124 In addition, regulations governing
exposure to cotton dust continued to be strengthened (at increasing cost)
despite no marginal improvement in lives saved. 125 As Viscusi notes, the
fundamental problem with these efforts is that they are dramatically out of line
126
which what the beneficiaries of the regulation believe the value to be.
127
Instead of being permitted to ignore cost concerns and economic feasibility,
Radionuclides/uranium
mines
Benzene
Arsenic/glass plant
Ethylene oxide
Arsenic/copper smelter
Uranium mill tailings,
inactive
Uranium mill tailings,
active
Asbestos
Asbestos
Arsenic, glass mfg.
Benzene/storage
Radionuclides/DOE
facilities
Radionuclides/elem.
phosphorous
Benzene/ethylbenzenol
styrene
Arsenic/low-arsenic
copper
Benzene/maleic
anhydride
Land Disposal
EDB
Formaldehyde

4

1984 F
1987 F
1986 F
1984 F
1986 F
1983 F

EPA
OSHA-H
EPA
OSHA-H
EPA
EPA

1.4 in 10
4
8.8 in 10
4
8.0 in 10

1983 F

EPA

4.3 in

1986 F
1989 F
1986 R
1984 R
1984 R

OSHA-H
EPA
EPA
EPA
EPA

6.7
2.9
3.8
6.0
4.3

1984 R

4.4 in 105
4
9.0 in 10
4
4.3 in 10
4

2.1

53

in 106

74.7
10
0.25
0.043
0.001

89.3
104.2
142
202
210

EPA

1.4 in 105

0.046

270

1984 R

EPA

2.0 in 106

0.006

483

1986 R

EPA

2.6 in 104

0.09

764

1984 R

EPA

1.1 in

106

0.029

820

1988 F
1989 R
1987 F

EPA
OSHA-H
OSHA-H

2.3 in 10'
4
2.5 in 10
6.8 in 107

2.52
0.002
0.01

3,500
15,600
72,000

10

in 10'
in 105
in 105
7
in 10

Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 700 (Table 20.4).
124 See id. at 701 (referring to the formaldehyde regulation as "[o]ne of the all-time
leaders in terms of the cost per life saved").
125 See Paul W. Kolp & W. Kip Viscusi, Uncertainty in Risk Analysis: A Retrospective
Assessment of the OSHA Cotton Dust Standard, 4 Advs. in Applied Microeconomics 105
(1986).
126 See Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 701 (noting that if certain OSHA regulations save
lives at a cost of $92.5 million per life, then "such efforts are out of line with what the
beneficiaries of such an effort believe the value of such a regulation to be").
127 See Am. Trucking Assns., 121 S. Ct. at 908-12 (holding that the EPA is not required to
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sound public policy dictates that federal safety regulations be designed
sensibly, responsibly and efficiently. I propose that all regulations satisfy a
marginal cost-benefit and risk-risk analysis, that risk-assessment be unbiased

and based on "most-likely" estimates, that regulatory triggers be justified
publicly, and that ex-post evaluations of the results be conducted.
A.

At a Minimum, Regulatory ProgramsShould Compare Costs and Benefits

The first and most important step in improving the efficiency of federal
regulatory oversight policy is to require a sensible cost-benefit analysis before
any regulation is implemented. Surely, no one would advocate for a regulatory
"solution" to a market failure that imposed greater costs than the benefits
yielded. Society would be better off sticking with the evil it knew rather than
making the situation worse.
Cost-benefit analysis in its simplest form is a very familiar concept. 128 It
requires a weighing of the total costs imposed by a new regulatory scheme
versus the overall benefits to society as a result of its implementation. 129 One
might think that such a concept would hardly be controversial and must
already be a prerequisite to any government regulation. On the contrary,
however, cost-benefit analysis has been assailed as immoral for explicitly
trading dollars per lives saved 130 and as impractical in terms of its ability to
accurately measure the costs incurred and benefits created (see infra, Part
31

V).1
Many regulatory agencies therefore argue against employing cost-benefit

analysis at all. 132 The EPA, for one, contends that cost-benefit analysis does
consider costs of its policies under the broad discretion that Congress and the Clean Air Act
delegated to the agency).
128 See Gramlich, supra n. 52, at 1-8 (describing the common sense intuition behind costbenefit analysis).
129 See

id.

130 E.g. Moore, supra n. 42, at 208-09 (opining that "if all the practical obstacles to

adopting cost-benefit analysis are overcome, what remains is the fundamental issue of
whether it is moral for society to take the life of a citizen merely because of the cost");
Richardson, supra n. 40, at 973, 975-76 (noting that cost-benefit analysis "runs roughshod
over important incommensurables" and arguing that willingness to pay is inappropriate as a
normative standard for public choice).
131E.g. Nussbaum, supra n. 40, at 1029 (stating that "there are devastating objections to
be made against willingness to pay" as a measurement tool); Sen, supra n. 40, at 945-46
(noting that the "basic limitations of this approach include those experienced also by market
signaling").
132 E.g. Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO, 448 U.S. at 630-38 (describing OSHA's use of
methods other than cost-benefit analysis in promulgating a regulation); Am. Textile Mfg.
Inst., 452 U.S. at 506-22 (1981) (undercutting the role of cost-benefit analysis in the
development of OSHA regulations); Am. Trucking Assns., 121 S. Ct. at 910 (holding that the
EPA is not required to consider costs of its policies under the broad discretion that Congress
and the Clean Air Act delegated to the agency).
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not serve society's ultimate goal (as reflected by Congress in the Clean Air
Act), which is to "protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources
so as to promote the public health and welfare . ,,133 However, such a goal is
unquestionably not in our nation's best interests if it is unaccompanied by a
common sense comparison of the regulatory benefits created to the costs
imposed. If we were to attempt to make our air as safe as possible, we would
be choosing to ignore the fact that there is declining marginal benefit to each
dollar spent improving its purity. 34 At some point, the "bang per each buck
spent" is no longer noticeable, and we should instead channel our remaining
resources where the impact on improving quality of life is greater.
Despite the occasional aversion to reasonable cost-benefit comparisons, the
concept is not nearly as marginalized as some would have it. Two recent D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals cases have effectively implied a form of cost-benefit
analysis into EPA regulations by requiring "reasoned decisionmaking" in
interpreting and enforcing regulations. 135 While this does not require the use
of traditional cost-benefit analysis, Richard Stoll believes that it may "drive
additional cost-benefit discipline into EPA decisionmaking .... 136
First, in American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit faced the
issue of whether oil reclaimed from primary processing of industrial
wastewater was considered "discarded" under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act. 137 The court held that the EPA did not sufficiently explain why

its regulation for oil processing concentrated more on cleaning the water and
less on recovering the oil for other possible industrial uses. 138 The EPA had
not considered the industrial costs and benefits of this processing despite the
fact that the record indicated that it might be cost-efficient for companies
without any additional motivation from the Clean Water Act regulations. 39 In
overturning the regulation, the D.C. Circuit was able to imply cost-benefit
analysis into the "reasoned decision-making" that the EPA should have
40
conducted. 1
Similar analysis was applied in Chemical Manufacturers Association v.
13 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1994).
134 See Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 664-68 (demonstrating that "[a]s environmental

quality improves, the cost of providing environmental quality rises... at an increasing rate
because improvements in an environmental quality become increasingly costly to achieve").
"I Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 216 F.3d 50, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Chem. Mfrs. Assn. v.
EPA, 217 F.3d 861, 867 (D.C. Cir. 2000). But see Am. Trucking Assns., 121 S. Ct. at 910-

12 (holding that the EPA cannot use cost-benefit analysis in formulating regulation).
136 Richard G. Stoll, Cost-Benefit Analysis Through the Back Door of "Reasoned
Decisionmaking"?, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,228 (2001).
13' 216 F.3d at 56-57.
138

Id. at 58.

139 Id.

"4 Id.at 59; Stoll, supra n. 136, at 10230 (reasoning that despite no mention of costbenefit analysis in the relevant language, "EPA's failure to evaluate costs and benefits in
this context resulted in judicial rejection of its rule").
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EPA.14 1 There, the EPA had established procedural requirements for
compliance with hazardous waste burning regulations without making any
findings regarding environmental benefits or the costs imposed. The D.C.
Circuit vacated the regulation given the lack of "reasoned decision-making"
exhibited. 42 The court elaborated on the Supreme Court's State Farm
standard, 143 stating that the agency must articulate "a satisfactory explanation
for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made."' 44
Thus, the notion of including cost-benefit analysis in agency decisionmaking is not unheard of in the judiciary. Both the American Petroleum and
Chemical Manufacturerscourts were willing to imply such a requirement by
inquiring whether the agency engaged in "reasoned decision-making" in
reaching its regulatory interpretation. 145 One should note that both of these
cases shared two elements in common. First, the relevant statutory authority
was silent regarding the use of cost-benefit analysis. Second, the agency rules
were overturned because they did not adequately evaluate benefits in light of
costs. In effect, a cost-benefit analysis was judicially implied. 46 Still, despite
these examples of judicially imposed cost-benefit tests, courts have not
routinely incorporated or imposed such analysis on agency regulations. At a
minimum though, benefits and costs should at least be assessed to ensure that
proposed regulations serve our national interest efficiently and responsibly
without doing more harm than good.
B.

One Step Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: ComparingMarginal Costs
Versus Marginal Benefits

In the abstract then, it is easy for all to agree that our government should not
141217

F.3d at 865-67.

Id. at 867.
143 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983) (holding that government agencies must use "reasoned decisionmaking" in promulgating their regulations).
144Id. at 865-66.
145Am. Petroleum Inst., 216 F.3d at 57; Chem. Mfrs. Assn., 217 F.3d at 867. The
analysis in both cases first considered the familiar Chevron "two-step" test: (1) Did
Congress directly address the matter? If yes, its unambiguous intent must be followed. If
not, then the analysis reaches the second step: (2) Is the agency regulation a "permissible
construction" of the statute? Once the agency interpretation passed the permissive Chevron
test, the D.C. Circuit then applied the rule handed down in State Farm. There, the Court
held that government agencies must use "reasoned decision-making" in promulgating their
regulations. The D.C. Circuit elaborated upon this standard, stating that the agency must
articulate "a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made" and that the agency must consider any other "relevant
factors." Chem. Mfrs. Assn., 217 F.3d at 866.
146See Stoll, supra n. 136, at 10,230 (stating that the court vacated the EPA rule because
"EPA's decisionmaking process did not adequately evaluate benefits in light of costs").
142
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pursue regulatory policies that create greater costs than benefits. Few scholars,
however, have suggested pushing the cost-benefit requirement one step further:
to compare those costs and benefits on a marginal basis rather than on an
absolute one. 147 It is this marginal comparison that would yield society the
greatest net gain and do far more to serve our country's best interests than we
currently have been able to do. Regulators should ask not merely whether the
benefits created by a given program exceed the costs imposed, but rather,
whether the regulation maximizes the benefits minus the costs.
Why is a marginal cost-benefit comparison so much better than a simple
cost-benefit analysis? The answer relates to the concept of diminishing returns
to money, as shown in Figures 1 and 2 below. 148 The initial dollars that the
government spends regulating the clean-up of environmental hazards go a long
way towards improving public safety. However, as our air and water and
workplaces are made safer, it becomes increasingly more difficult to improve
them further. Each additional dollar devoted to the effort has less of an impact.
Eventually, each incremental resource has a barely noticeable effect on
improving safety, though one dollar in U.S. currency spent at the beginning of
the program is still equal to one dollar in U.S. currency expended towards the
end. At some point, we must ask ourselves, "Is it worth it to continue trying to
improve the safety of this situation given the fact that we already have 99% of
the risk eliminated, and each dollar we add to the fire barely improves the
149
situation at all?"'
The figures below illustrate what Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer has
referred to as the problem of "Tunnel Vision," or "The Last 10 Percent."' 50 At
hazardous waste sites, for example, Breyer states that 90% or more of agency
resources are spent to clean up the last 10% of the risk posed, whereas it takes
51
only the first 10% of those resources to eliminate 90% of the total risk.'
Viscusi argues that these numbers are even starker in the Superfund

147 Viscusi and his colleagues have suggested the marginal cost-benefit comparison. See
Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 667 (urging comparison on a marginal basis).
141

id. at 665-66.

Donald J. Calandrillo, former Pipe Stress/Support Engineer at Foster Wheeler Energy
Corp., Telephone Interview (July 1,2001) (discussing the problem of diminishing returns in
the context of factory pollution-abatement equipment).
150 Breyer, supra n. 20, at 11-12.
"'1See id. Breyer cites to a former EPA administrator, Leo Levenson, who noted that
"about 95 percent of the toxic material could be removed from waste sites in a few months,
but years are spent trying to remove the last little bit." (citing Unnecessary Risks, Graduate
School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley (Dec. 6, 1989), quoted in Aaron
Wildavsky, If Claims of Harm from Technology Are False, Mostly False, or Unproven,
What Does That Tell Us About Science?, in Health, Lifestyle, and Environment: Countering
the Panic 111, 115 n. 9 (Social Affairs Unit, Manhattan Institute, 1991)).
149
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environmental cleanup context, opining that if the U.S. cut 99% of the money
spent on clean-up (which could then be reallocated to other social programs),
we would lose only 1% of the total effectiveness of the program.1 52 For
example, both Viscusi and Breyer recount the case of United States v. Ottati &
Goss, Inc.,' 53 which arose out of a ten-year litigation effort to force the cleanup of a toxic waste dump in southern New Hampshire. The land was already
mostly cleaned up, and all but one of the private parties had settled. 154 Still,
the remaining litigant pursued the cost of cleaning up the "last little bit,"
forcing an additional expenditure of $9.3 million in public resources to remove
the remaining toxins by incinerating the dirt.1 55 The extra safety provided by
this $9.3 million outlay was negligible. By all accounts, the dirt was already
safe enough for children playing on the site to eat it for up to seventy days a

Figure 1. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Safety Regulation
costs

$

benefits

Benefits flatten out as the
scale of the regulatory
program increases and
costs begin to skyrocket.

slope = MB

ma imum net
b ef its
inus costs

slope

= MC

The slopes of the curves
equal marginal benefit (MB)
and marginal cost (MC),
respectively.

Environmental Quality

152 W. Kip Viscusi, Lecture (Harvard L. Sch., Cambridge, Mass., Apr. 20, 1998) (copy of
transcript on file with Boston University Law Review).
' 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990).
154 See Breyer, supra n. 20, at 12.
"' See id.
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year! 156 Burning the soil made it safe enough for children to consume dirt for
an astonishing 245 days without substantial harm. 157 If this were not bad
enough, the problem was compounded by the fact that no children lived at the
site (it was a swamp), that future construction therefore seemed unlikely, and
that the parties agreed that at least half of the volatile organic chemicals would
evaporate on their own by the year 2000.158 To spend nearly $10 million in
public resources to protect non-existent, "dirt-eating" children makes
absolutely no sense. This example of the problem of "The Last 10 Percent" is
not meant to suggest that there is no value to mitigating environmental hazards.
Rather, it simply means that we need to allocate scarce public resources in a far
more cost-effective manner to clean up the right sites to the right level of
safety. 159

Figure 2. Marginal Analysis of Environmental Safety Regulation
Marginal costs increase and marginal
benefits decrease as we increase the
scale of the regulatory policy.

$
Marginal
Costs
(MC)

Regulations should maximize benefits
minus costs:
If MB > MC, then we should tighten
the regulation because it would yield a
bigger benefit to society than the
amount we are giving up in increased

MB = MC

Marginal
/Benefits

(MB)
1Environmental Quality

156

costs.

However, if MB < MC, then we should
decrease the scale of the regulatory
program because incremental costs
exceed incremental benefits.

See id.

157 See id.

158 See id.
159 See Crandall, supra n. 73, at 110-30. Crandall believes that, contrary to what sensible

cost-benefit considerations would dictate, congressional voting patterns are far more
determinative of which environmental risks actually get addressed-or over-addressed.
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The "Last 10 Percent" principle and the concept of diminishing returns
highlight the value of instituting a marginal cost-benefit calculus into U.S.
regulatory oversight policy. For any given program that society decides to
undertake, the marginal benefit from each additional dollar spent declines as
successive dollars continue to be spent, as shown above in Figure 2.160
Conversely, marginal costs increase as the scale of the regulatory program
expands, even though overall benefits still exceed overall costs. At a certain
point, somewhere in the middle of Figures 1 and 2, marginal benefits from a
given regulatory program equal the marginal costs. (This occurs where the
slope of the total cost curve equals the slope of the benefits curve on Figure 1
and where the lines intersect on Figure 2.) If society continues to go further
than this point with the stringency of its regulatory program, marginal costs
exceed marginal benefits. This means that for every additional dollar spent,
society gets less than a dollar back in benefits. If we take the scale of the
regulation far enough, marginal costs can become so high and marginal
benefits so low that even overall costs begin to outweigh total benefits.
Thus, it is easy to see from the above figures and analysis that regulatory
oversight policy would most improve social welfare in America if we require
that a given regulatory scheme choose the point at which its marginal benefits
equaled its marginal costs. This is quite different than simply requiring that
total benefits outweigh total costs. For instance, many regulatory programs
pass the "total benefits exceed total costs" test, but that does not mean that we
have successfully chosen the test and the scale of the program that would give
us the greatest social value for the expenditure. If we merely compare total (or
average) costs versus total benefits, regulatory tightenings that come towards
the latter stages may have almost no effect on reducing risk, but they can cost
substantial sums of money. The OSHA standard for ethylene oxide exposure
(which mainly affects hospital workers involved in the cleaning of surgical
equipment) is a prominent example. 16 1 The agency's regulatory analysis
concentrated on the average cost per case of cancer prevented, even though the
OSHA official who made the calculation acknowledged that the previous
incremental tightening of the standard produced zero effect on reduction of
cancer risk. 62 Similarly, Viscusi details three stringency levels of arsenic
regulations that OSHA considered-loose, medium, and tight, as represented
in Table 1.163

160Although marginal benefits are constantly declining, overall benefits continue to
increase, albeit more slowly as each dollar is spent.
16 See Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 667-68 (discussing OSHA standards for ethylene
oxide exposure).
162 See id. (noting that OSHA's ethylene oxide exposure regulations did not take account
of the fact that "the last incremental tightening of the standard produced no reduction in
cancer cases whatsoever").
163 Id.
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Table 1. Stringency Levels of Possible OSHA Arsenic Regulations
Stringency
Loose
Medium
Tight

Standard Level
(mg/m 3)
0.10
0.05
0.004

Average Cost Marginal Cost
per Life Saved per Life Saved
$1.25 million
$1.25 million
$2.92 million
$11.5 million
$5.63 million
$68.1 million

The average costs per life saved at these levels were $1.25 million, $2.92
million and $5.63 million respectively. 164 All appear to be relatively
reasonable. However, the marginal costs per life saved at these different levels
of regulatory strictness were $1.25 million, $11.5 million, and $68.1 million
respectively. 165 When one looks at marginal values, it becomes clear that final
regulatory tightenings may cost a great deal more money to society than the
initial ones, without producing nearly the same benefits. Using total or
average costs only serves to hide the prohibitive expenses associated with the
strictest regulatory tightenings.
This type of marginal analysis reasoning was presumably behind President
Bush's decision to withdraw President Clinton's proposed arsenic standards
pending further study. The Clinton regulation would have tightened the
166
maximum allowable arsenic level from 50 parts per billion (ppb) to 10 ppb.
No cost-benefit analysis was conducted, however, and EPA administrator
Christine Todd Whitman therefore asked the National Academy of Sciences to
study the risk factors involved in setting the standard at anywhere from 3 ppb
to 20 ppb. 167 For example, it might make sense to limit arsenic levels in
drinking water to 20 ppb instead of the current 50 ppb because it is
economically feasible to do so, and because the payoff in terms of human lives
saved is significant despite the costs. But, it might also make sense not to
continue tightening the arsenic standard from 20 ppb down to 10 (or 3) ppb if
the costs increase exponentially in that next interval with only a minimal
benefit to human quality of life. 168 This is true even if overall benefits to
society continue to be greater under a 10 ppb standard than under the current
50 ppb standard. 169 Hence, by using marginal analysis, decision-makers can
164

Id.

165See id.

166 Heilprin, supra n. 4.
167 Id.
168 The principle of diminishing returns instructs us that the costs involved in making
various hazards safer are rarely linear. For instance, while some assume that the cost of
reducing arsenic levels from 30 ppb to 20 ppb should be the same as reducing it from 20 ppb
to 10 ppb (since arsenic exposures have been cut by 10 ppb each time), the actual cost is
likely to be significantly greater in the 20 ppb to 10 ppb interval.
161 1 note that as of August 1, 2001, the Senate and House voted to overturn the Bush
administration's decision to study arsenic safety levels further, instead imposing the 10 ppb
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most clearly see what level of regulation stringency is best for our country.
In sum, by choosing the point at which marginal costs equal marginal
benefits, agencies would be designing regulations that maximize the benefits
minus the costs. This is the optimal point with respect to increasing overall
social welfare in America. Employing this approach will make the size of the
pie the biggest it can possibly be, and it will allow for allocation of resources
to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number.
C.

Require a Risk-Risk Analysis-EvaluateSubstitution Risks

In addition to evaluating the marginal costs and benefits that federal
regulatory programs create, responsible regulators should also be required to
consider the substitution risks introduced. Lester Lave 170 and Judge Stephen
Williams of the D.C. Circuit 17 1 have referred to this notion as "risk versus risk"
analysis. The intuition behind it is that well-meaning regulations aimed at
improving public safety by reducing certain risks sometimes unintentionally
increase the probability of other risks. 172 Even if the direct financial costs of a

regulation are lower than the benefits created, it does not make sense to
introduce that regulation if it creates a sizeable new risk that previously did not
exist.
There are two general categories of risk-risk analysis that merit
examination. 173 First, there is a direct risk-risk tradeoff that is created by
regulatory efforts. 174 For example, if the Federal Aviation Administration
("FAA") requires parents to buy separate seats for their infants accompanying
them in airplanes so that babies will have their own seatbelts, then the cost of

standard immediately. Some analysts have stated that it could cost communities (especially
those in the West where naturally occurring arsenic levels are higher) up to $200 million
annually to comply with the new rules. In order to meet the expense, Senator Pete
Domenici, R-N.M., has proposed legislation requiring federal assistance to communities that
must upgrade their water systems to lower their naturally occurring arsenic levels. Senator
Conrad Bums of Montana observed: "I'll tell you one thing we don't have naturally, and
that's enough money." See Alan Fram, Senate Votes for Arsenic Standards, Associated
Press (August 1, 2001) (available in 2001 WL 25489246).
170 See Lave, supra n. 17, at 15-17 (describing a "risk-risk" framework for regulation).
For a discussion of the issues that arise when risks are traded off against one another, see
generally John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in Risk
Versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment (John D. Graham &
Jonathan Baert Wiener, eds., Harvard 1995).
...See Intl. Union, UAWv. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1326-27 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams,
concurring) (discussing risk-risk tradeoffs and noting that excessive regulatory expenditures
make society poorer, potentially worsening individual health).
172See e.g. Lave, supra n. 17, at 16-17 (posing possibility that an increase in grain
production unintentionally stimulated by regulating risk from administering growth
hormones to cattle would increase occupational risks of the grain farmers).
173Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 705.
174 Id.
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an additional ticket might lead some parents to drive, which is a significantly
riskier mode of travel. 175 Likewise, eliminating pesticides from our diet by
eating organic produce would reduce the risk of cancer from those pesticides,
but if the result is that we consume fewer fruits and vegetables in response, our
overall cancer risk might increase.' 76 A third example is that presented by the
Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC") original regulation requiring
the coating of children's sleepwear with the flame retardant Tris.177 The CPSC
later discovered that this chemical was potentially carcinogenic. 78 If the
incremental risk involved in wearing fire-resistant clothing coated in Tris is
worse than the original danger presented by sleeping in unprotected pajamas,
society should choose not to regulate. We never want to create a new risk that
79
is worse than the old one.'

Second, when government agencies pass risk-reducing regulations, a certain
amount of economic activity is generated, which presents indirect risks of its
own.' 80 For example, if an EPA regulation requires that factories emit only a
certain level of pollution, energy and activity will be expended by producers of
pollution-abatement equipment to make the necessary products to curb
pollution to regulated levels.' 81 All economic activity carries some degree of
danger, be it from worker injuries or illnesses.' 82 If the pollution-abatement
equipment yields only a small benefit, but workers are exposed to extremely
hazardous chemicals in order to produce or install it, we must query whether
such a regulation is really in society's best interests. Thus, a responsible
regulatory oversight scheme must consider these indirect risks created by wellintended regulatory efforts.
Furthermore, an additional form of risk-risk analysis has developed in recent
years, focusing on the negative correlation between individual income and
mortality.' 8 3 Simply speaking, the wealthier that people are, the healthier they
171

Viscusi, supra n. 1, at 1449.

Id. (citing Bruce N. Ames & Lois Swirsky Gold, Environmental Pollution and
Cancer: Some Misconceptions, in Phantom Risk: Scientific Inference and the Law 153, 17678 (Kenneth R. Foster et al. eds., MIT Press 1993)).
117W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating Consumer Product Safety 111 (Am. Enterprise Inst.
1984).
176

178 Id.

An analogy is sometimes made to rent control regulations in the landlord-tenant
arena. Society's noble intention in promulgating rent-control ordinances is to ensure
affordable housing for the poor and working class. However, it sometimes leads to housing
shortages and dilapidated apartment buildings, as landlords lose their incentive to build new
units or maintain existing ones.
so Viscusi, supra n. 1, at 1451.
181See Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 705.
179

182

Id.

83 Viscusi,

supra n. 1, at 1452; see generally Intl. Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d

1310, 1326-27 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams, J., concurring) (discussing this type of risk-risk
analysis).
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tend to be.184 Given the fact that all regulations impose some costs on
individuals, they necessarily reduce people's wealth to some degree. At a
certain point, when income is reduced by a large enough amount in the
aggregate, it can be expected that somewhere someone will lose his or her life.
The question becomes: "What amount of income loss is necessary before we
can statistically expect one death to be caused in the United States?" Studies
by Randall Lutter and John F. Morrall III have examined the link between
individual income and mortality, and they concluded that a statistical life can
be expected to be sacrificed for a societal income decrease approximating ten
million dollars. 85 The study by the United States Joint Economic Committee
186
on this matter placed the cost at three million dollars per statistical life,
whereas Viscusi's analysis has placed the value at approximately fifty million
dollars in government expenditures before a life is lost.' 87 Whatever the exact
value may be, the overarching message is clear: bad regulations not only cost
88
money unnecessarily; they also cost lives.
Thus, if the combination of new direct and indirect risks created by a
proposed federal regulation exceeds the risks eliminated by that well-meaning
program, it does not make sense to promulgate it. All regulations should
reduce current risks by a greater amount than the additional risks they impose
on society.
D.

CalculateRisks Objectively-Avoid Risk Manipulation

Assuming that regulatory oversight policy adopts marginal cost-benefit and
risk-risk analysis, we still must tackle the tricky issue of how to calculate risks.
This dilemma is closely related to the most common criticism of cost-benefit
analysis-that it is not possible to assign an accurate numerical value to all
' Viscusi, supra n. 1, at 1452; see generally W. Kip Viscusi, Mortality Effects of
Regulatory Costs and Policy Evaluation Criteria, 25 RAND J. Econ. 94, 96-108 (1994)
[hereinafter Mortality Effects] (deriving this relationship). There are various reasons why
wealthy individuals tend to lead longer lives than poorer people, including better education
on the health risks of certain activities and better access to medical care. See Viscusi, supra
n. 1, at 1452-54.
185 Randall Lutter and John F. Morrall III, Health-Health Analysis: A New Way to
Evaluate Health and Safety Regulation, 8 J. Risk & Uncertainty 1, 43-66 (1993).
186 Viscusi, supra n. 1, at 1452 (stating that the United States Joint Economic Committee
calculated that a 3% drop in real per capita income during the 1973 recession generated a
2.3% increase in mortality).
187 Viscusi, supra n. 1, at 1454; see generally Viscusi, Mortality Effects supra n. 184 at
96-108 (detailing the calculations leading to this result). Because of the correlation between
income and health, Viscusi has developed an alternative analysis that does not estimate the
income-mortality relationship directly. Instead it links the amount of money people are
willing to spend and the expenditures that will lead to the loss of a statistical life. Viscusi,
supra n. 1, at 1454.
188 Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 706 (asserting that there is a mortality cost to regulation
because of the shift in funding to regulation and away from other areas such as healthcare).
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costs and benefits of a given regulatory program. 189 True, cost-measurement
and risk-assessment are difficult tasks because of some degree of "fuzziness"
of the variables. Whenever a measurement is not clearly objective in nature, it
offers an opportunity for people to manipulate the calculation to serve
whatever interests they represent. 190
Hence, I urge that responsible federal safety regulations be based on
scientifically objective risks as much as they possibly can in order to guard
against the problem of subjectivity. The problems caused by subjectivity are
vividly evidenced by a recent example, referred to by the media as the
"Doomsday Rock." In 1998, there was growing fear that an asteroid was on a
collision course with earth and that our government might have to act quickly
to "save the world."
Dr. Brian Marsden of the Central Bureau for
Astronomical Telegrams (the agency responsible for a nationwide asteroid
warning system) estimated the probability of the asteroid hitting the planet at
one in six thousand---quite a serious risk given the devastating
consequences. 191 It set off a brief panic and was covered relentlessly by the
media for several days. 192 However, Marsden and his team of astronomers
made this calculation based on incomplete information and might have
manipulated various probabilities in an effort to find an "exciting" result. 193
Fortunately, the true probability was approximately one in two million, and the
earth has thus far survived. 194
Nevertheless, this extreme example
demonstrates that if risks are not calculated objectively, the government might
unnecessarily react or regulate to curb risks that were never very likely to
materialize. 195

189 See Robert Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68
U. Chi. L. Rev. 323, 373-74 (2001) (concluding that in conducting cost-benefit analysis,
estimates of people's willingness to pay for regulatory benefits may be systematically
understated because conventional analysis assumes that economic decisions are based on
absolute income acting in isolation rather than on "relative" position). The measurement
difficulties inherent in cost-benefit analysis will be discussed in greater detail infra, Part
V.A.
19o See generally Stigler, supra n. 8, at 4-6 (warning against the potential of interest
group "capture" of regulatory agencies).
191W. Kip Viscusi, Lecture (Harvard L. Sch., Cambridge, Mass., Apr. 6, 1998) (copy of
transcript on file with Boston University Law Review).
192Kathy Sawyer, After False Alarm, Astronomers Feud over Prophesying Threats,

Wash. Post A3 (Apr. 12, 1998).
193 Id. Dr. Marsden admitted, "I had great trouble getting anybody to look for it.... So
the announcement was designed to get more people to look for it.... I suppose I wanted to
overcome a certain apathy among astronomers. That worked." Id. (second ellipsis in
original). The astronomical community barraged Dr. Marsden with criticism for his
inaccurate risk assessment, accusing him of "crying wolf." Id.
194 W. Kip Viscusi, Lecture (Harvard L. Sch., Cambridge, Mass., Apr. 6, 1998) (copy of
transcript on file with Boston University Law Review).
195 Given the need to seek unbiased risk calculations, we should also heed George
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Responsible and efficient regulatory policy must therefore address objective
risks that actually threaten society, rather than risks that are politically or
subjectively created. By requiring unbiased risk-assessment policies, society
would be better able to focus its resources and regulatory efforts on significant
problems that must be addressed, rather than on speculative or fabricated ones.
E.

Correct Societal Risk Misperceptions

Moreover, in focusing on objective risks, regulatory policy must address the
serious problem of systematic risk misperception.1 96 Some risks are clearly
objective in nature-for instance, the percentage chance that a person will die
of lung cancer from smoking cigarettes. 97 Although these risks can be
calculated with reasonable certainty, the public's perception of their frequency
and their severity is often highly inaccurate.1 98 People tend to overestimate the
risks of terrifying but, in actuality, extremely low-probability events, such as
dying from a tornado, flood, or botulism. 199 More shocking is that the risk of
death from eating four tablespoons of peanut butter per day is over ten times
greater than the risk of death from drinking water containing the EPA limit of
chloroform, and it is approximately five hundred times greater than drinking

Stigler's warning about the potential for industry capture of regulatory agencies. See
Stigler, supra n. 8, at 4-6. When money is allowed to influence decisionmakers, accurate
risk assessment will inevitably suffer. Cf Smith & Calandrillo, supra n. 8, at 716-19
(discussing the potential for regulatory capture of state legislatures, resulting in sub-optimal
results from society's perspective).
196 See Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 661-63 (arguing that public misperception of risk
levels generates irrational market decisions and that public overestimation of risk levels
diverts too many resources to risks that are not of great consequence).
197 The annual risks posed by certain common events and activities are reproduced infra
in note 200.
198 See Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 661-63 (giving examples of the risks of various
events and asserting that highly publicized events are often associated with substantial risk
perceptions, even though the risks involved may not be great). I should note that the
public's misperception of risk is not always a sign of individual irrationality. To the extent
that tragic events themselves are highly publicized without any mention of frequency
statistics for those events, individuals might rationally attribute a greater risk to those events
occurring than the actual risk. Id. at 663. It is thus incumbent upon the media and
government to try to educate citizens as to frequency of risks so that publicity does not
distort public perception beyond reality. See id. (suggesting that a possible government
response to this public misperception of risk is to attempt to educate the public about its
overly alarmist reactions).
199 See Baruch Fischhoff et al., Acceptable Risk 29 fig. 2.4 (Cambridge U. Press 1981)
(reprinted in Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 662 fig. 19.2) (reporting the results of a study in
which educated people overestimated the likelihood of causes of death that are unusually
visible, sensational, and easy to imagine and that tend to be overreported in the news
media); Viscusi, supra n. 2, at 662 (discussing the results of the study reported by
Fischhoff).
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water containing the EPA limit of trichloroethylene. 200 Conversely, people
generally underestimate the risks of relatively common tragedies, such as
201
cancer, heart disease, and stroke.
There are several implications for society's systematic misperception of
202
risk. First, it means that market decisions will often be less than optimal.
However, that alone does not imply that additional regulation will be
necessary. 20 3 As Viscusi reasons, if risk perceptions are already excessive, the
market-provided solution will attempt to offer safety levels that correspond to

200 See

Richard Wilson & E. A.C. Crouch, Risk Assessment and Comparisons. An

Introduction, 236 Sci. 267, 268 tbl. 2 (April 1987) (reprinted in Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at
673 tbl. 19.6). The risks posed by some other common events and activities are as follows:
Action
Motor vehicle accident (total)
Motor vehicle accident (pedestrian only)
Home accidents
Electrocution
Air pollution, eastern U.S.

An nual Risk of Death
4
2.4 x 10-

Cigarette smoking, one pack per day
Sea-level background radiation (except radon)
All cancers
Four tablespoons of peanut butter per day
Drinking water with EPA limit of chloroform
Drinking water with EPA limit of trichloroethylene
Alcohol, light drinker
Police killed in line of duty (total)
Police killed in line of duty (by felons)
Frequent flying professor
Mountaineering (mountaineers)

4.2 x
1.1 x
5.3 x
2x

105
-4
10

3.6 x
2x
2.8 x
8x
6x
2x
2x
2.2 x
1.3 x
5x
6x

10

10-6
10-4
-3

10.
3
1010.6
10.7
10.
5
1010-4
104
10.
10-4

L

11L
a

y

10%
10%
5%
5%
Factor of 20,
downward only
Factor of 3
Factor of 3
10%
Factor of 3
Factor of 10
Factor of 10
Factor of 10
20%
10%
50%
50%

Id. The uncertainty value in the third column reflects the range of uncertainty of the actual
mean risk value in the second column. For example, the "Factor of 10" notation in the third
column means that the actual mean risk of the actions in the first column could be ten times
greater or ten times less than the "Annual Risk of Death" value in the second column.
Similarly, the "Factor of 20 downward only" notation in the third column for the annual risk
of death from air pollution in the eastern United States means that the actual mean risk could
be as much as twenty times less than the "Annual Risk of Death" value in the second
column. See Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 673.
201 See Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 662 (arguing that individuals tend to overestimate the
risks associated with lower-probability events and underestimate the risks associated with
higher-probability events, suggesting that market decisions will seldom be optimal).
202 Id.
203 Id.
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exaggerated risk perceptions 2 4 -i.e., certain products may be made too safe
because of misperceived risks, leading to greater costs than necessary to
2 05
mitigate them.
Second, the overestimation of low-probability events has significant
ramifications for regulatory policy. If people overreact to very small risks and
exert pressure on politicians to remedy them, the resulting regulatory policies
may devote too many resources to minor risks and too few resources to more
significant dangers. 20 6 For example, if citizens overestimate the risk caused by
living near hazardous waste sites or nuclear power plants, society may spend
more money to locate such facilities in remote areas even though the risks
20 7
created by placing them in more populated areas are not appreciably greater.
The question becomes then: "Should government still try to institute policies
that reflect the misperceptions held by its citizens in order to increase people's
'psychic' well-being?" 20 8 Or, should government responsibly try to educate
2°9
society about the true risks in order to formulate regulations more optimally?
Obviously, the best solution would be for government to communicate
information to the public, and to issue efficient regulations necessary to control
2 10
and correct the "real" risks society faces.
F.

Focus on Average Risks, Not Worst Case Scenarios

In addition to correcting systematic risk misperceptions, responsible
regulatory policy should address average or most-common risks, rather than

204

Id.

205

Conversely, if risk perceptions are consistently too low with respect to certain goods,

the market solution will inadequately address the risk, and government regulation will be
necessary even if the public disagrees. See id. at 663 (asserting that if the general public
underestimates the risk, one presumably would not expect the government to remain idle
and let citizens incur risks unknowingly).
206 See id.
207 One would have to live within five miles of a nuclear reactor for fifty years before
one would incur a one-in-one-million chance of death caused by a radiation accident at the
plant. See id. at 659 tbl. 19.2 (citing Richard Wilson, Analyzing the Daily Risks of Life, 81
Tech. Rev. 40, 40-46 (1979)). Likewise, the costs of placing hazardous waste dumps in
more populated areas might be substantially less than regulating their placement to less
populated areas, because the transportation costs might increase dramatically. One should
balance these decreased costs against the relative risks and benefits of placement in both
areas, however, to determine the more responsible option.
208 See id. at 663 (asking rhetorically whether the government should respond to the
public's overestimation of risk to reflect the interest of its citizenry).
209 See id. (suggesting that a possible government response to this public misperception
of risk is to attempt to educate the public about its overly alarmist reactions).
210 See id. (stating that an important government function is to acquire more scientific
information than is feasible for an individual to obtain, communicate this information
effectively to the public, and issue regulations necessary to control real risks).
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worst-case scenarios. 211 Even in the case of relatively common risks, the
chances of such risks materializing are usually extremely small, 212 and the
exact probabilities are often highly uncertain. 213 Hence, when estimating risk
probabilities, government agencies often attempt to ascertain a range of
uncertainty levels within which the risks fall.214 Certain drinking water
contaminants, for instance, could pose an actual mean risk of ten times greater
or less than the annual risk calculated by the EPA. 215 The regulatory approach
to this uncertainty has been to use the upper end of the ninety-five percent
confidence level around a particular risk. 216 In other words, given uncertainty
and the principle of risk aversion, agencies try to take into account the worstcase scenario when predicting risks, and shape their regulations accordingly.
That way, the argument goes, the public can never be surprised or disappointed
when risks turn out to be greater than originally thought.
By erring on the side of conservatism, however, government agencies
actually distort the true risks posed, and they may impose more stringent
regulations than if they had attempted to measure average risks in the first
place. 2 17 As William Reilly notes, "[W]e have been regulating with a
211 The EPA, for example, at one time assessed risk posed by air pollution by defining
the upper bound of risk as the risk to a person-sometimes referred to as "Maximan"-who
lived twenty-four hours a day for seventy years at the location expected to receive the
heaviest concentration of the pollutant. See Comm. on Risk Assessment of Hazardous Air
Pollutants et al., Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment 46 (Natil. Acad. Press 1994)
(describing various methods of calculating pollutant exposure, including the traditional EPA
method, which reflects an unrealistic possibility of finding rare conditions occurring
together).
212 See Wilson & Crouch, supra n. 200, at 268 tbl. 2 (listing the annual risk and
uncertainty values for certain actions). For instance, the annual risk of death is about one in
five thousand from all motor vehicle accidents, one in ten thousand from all home accidents,
and one in two hundred thousand from electrocution. The problem of assigning utility
values to the reduction of such extremely small risks is discussed infra, Part V.C.
213 See id. The uncertainty levels for various risks of death can range from a low of
around ten percent-risk from motor vehicle accidents-to a high of a factor of twentyrisk from air pollution in the eastern United States. See supra n. 200 (listing the annual risk
and uncertainty values for certain actions).
214 See supra n. 200 (explaining the uncertainty ranges for the annual risk values).
215 See supra n. 200 (listing the annual risk and uncertainty values for certain actions and
explaining their uncertainty ranges) The annual risk of death from drinking water with the
EPA limit of chloroform bacteria was calculated at six in ten million, but the actual mean
risk could be ten times greater or less than this estimated annual risk.
216 See Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 673.
217 See Breyer, supra n. 20, at 10-29 (explaining how government regulation of small but
significant risks often leads to tunnel vision, random agenda selection, and inconsistency
instead of balanced and cost-effective regulation); Viscusi, supra n. 1,at 1437 (explaining
how the uncertainty of measuring risk probabilities causes agencies to use conservative risk
estimates, creating a bias in favor of regulating uncertain risks). Cf.Carnegie Commn. on
Sci., Tech. & Govt., Risk and the Environment: Improving Regulatory Decision Making 75,
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preposterous conservatism in terms both of unreasonable inferences from
animal data and unrealistic human-exposure assumptions. ' 218 Furthermore,
agencies typically base regulations on not one, but a series of conservative
assumptions. These individual worst-case estimates can compound upon each
other, making the final risk calculation highly inaccurate. 219 The cleanup of
the New Hampshire toxic waste dump in United States v. Ottati and Goss220 is
a prime example: one would be forced to assume that children played at the
site, which was a swamp; that they would eat dirt from the ground before the
22
toxins evaporated; and that they would do so for up to 245 days per year. '
The EPA spent over nine million dollars in public resources to prevent such a
worst-case scenario because it used the highest bound for all risk variables in
its calculus, resulting in risk assessment figures that were substantially greater
than actual risk.

222

Similarly, the Doomsday Rock example (described supra in Part IH.D)
highlights another case where focusing on worst-case scenarios yields highly
unreliable results. 223 Rather than arrive at accurate estimates of risk
probabilities--one in two million-the calculation became so distorted that it
was off by a factor of several hundred. 224 Intelligent government responses to
problematic situations are impossible if the risk estimates are so suspect.
Thus, by aiming to be "extra safe," government agencies avoid the problem
of addressing most-likely risks. Instead, compounding successive conservative

79, 81-82 (1993) (discussing the considerations in relative risk analysis and the assistance
that it provides to agencies in making sound policy decisions).
218 Robert Stavins, Carol M. Browner, William Ruckelshaus, Douglas Costle & William
Reilly, Environmental Protection: Is the Public Willing to Pay?, EPA J. 11, 16 (Winter
1995).
219 See Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra n. 64at 13-24 (describing the distortions in
regulatory policy caused by the use of "conservative" risk assessments); but see James E.
Krier, Risk and Design, 19 J. Leg. Stud. 781, 781-90 (1990) (defending the use of
conservative risk values).
220

900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990).

221

See Breyer, supra n. 20, at 11-12; supra nn. 153-158 and accompanying text

(discussing Ottatiand Goss).
222 See McGarity, supra n. 1, at 22 (discussing regulatory reformers' criticism of the
practice of basing risk assessment figures on "worst case" possibilities, which results in
unnecessarily protective policies). The EPA now makes a slightly less conservative highend exposure estimate, which is intended to constitute "a plausible estimate of the individual
exposure for those persons at the upper end of an exposure distribution." 57 Fed. Reg.
22888, 22901 (May 29, 1992) (describing the concept of high-end exposure, which is
supposed to give estimates of exposure in the upper range of the distribution but avoid
estimates beyond the true distribution).
223 See Malcom W. Browne, Frantic Hunt Found Photos that Deflated Asteroid Fears,
147 N.Y. Times A7, A7 (March 14, 1998).
224 W. Kip Viscusi, Lecture (Harvard L. Sch., Cambridge, Mass., Apr. 6, 1998) (copy of
transcript on file with Boston University Law Review).
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risk estimates makes the problem exponentially worse. It causes regulatory
efforts to focus inefficiently on solving worst-case scenarios that are extremely
unlikely to occur.2 25 This wastes public resources that certainly could be spent
better elsewhere-i.e., on poor children who need vaccinations rather than on
children who might eat contaminated dirt up to 245 days of the year.
So, what can be done to solve the problem? First, we should require that
226
regulatory agencies disclose mean risk values, not just worst-case scenarios.
Next, they should tell the public more about the uncertainty regarding costs
and benefits and provide information about the shape of the distribution of the
risk curve. If there is only a small chance of a given risk materializing, but
there is an unusually high degree of upward uncertainty, an appropriate
regulatory response might guard against the risk more than one would
otherwise think it should. Finally, regulatory agencies should be asked to
disclose best-case scenarios in addition to the most dire ones.2 27 In this
manner, the resulting policies may be as informed and educated as possible.
G.

Require Agencies to Publish and Justify Regulatory Triggers

Requiring government agencies to publish and justify their "regulatory
triggers" would also make sound policy sense. Regulatory triggers are those
levels of activity that will cause government agency regulations to come into
effect. For example, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") already publishes its
"safe harbor" merger guidelines in an effort to inform industry whether a given
combination of business entities could be deemed anti-competitive. 228 The
DOJ must think carefully about how to set the regulations to foster maximum
efficiency because it knows that by making them public, it is opening itself up
to scrutiny. In addition, by viewing these regulatory triggers, the firms
involved can ascertain ex-ante if they should fear a government investigation
into their proposed merger. They can then proceed with the planned
transaction or adjust their combination accordingly. Either way, they are fully
informed of the risks presented and can respond more appropriately.
Similarly, opening up agency rulemaking to public scrutiny likely would
enhance the quality of the reasoning behind regulatory decisions. 229 No
225 See Viscusi,

supra n. 1, at 1437 (noting that agencies have responded to the

uncertainty surrounding risk-probability values by using "conservative" risk assessments
that focus on upper-bound values).
226 Cf Viscusi, supra n. 22, at 76 (explaining how workers and firms may systematically
overestimate or underestimate risks and therefore the desirable properties imputed to market
outcomes may not prevail).
227 Cf.id. at 102-13 (explaining that individuals differ substantially in their value of life
and willingness to incur risks).
228 See Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 214 fig. 7.5 (illustrating the "safe harbors" for
mergers under the Department of Justice 1992 guidelines).
229 See Viscusi, supra n. 22, at 162-63 (arguing that publicizing regulators' views
enhances public debate, encourages better regulatory standards, and legitimizes the
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individual or agency wants to be exposed publicly as having not critically
considered a regulatory response to a problem. Ideally, by asking agencies to
publish and justify their triggers, they will give more careful thought to the
regulatory solution that society receives.
Additionally, if a regulatory agency such as the EPA published the point at
which it would require firms to curb certain pollutants or clean up certain
hazardous waste, those firms would have greater information at their disposal
to allow them to make educated determinations about how to allocate their
resources between production and pollution abatement. There would be less
need to issue sanctions in the first instance if "offenders" had knowledge
regarding potential regulatory triggers, and could adjust their behavior
accordingly. Society would also be better off because it would obtain the
results it was seeking without incurring the costs of regulation.
Hence, requiring the publication and justification of agency regulatory
triggers should improve the quality and efficiency of federal safety regulations
and generate more optimal responses by those regulated groups.
H.

Require Agencies to Perform Ex-Post Evaluations of Their Regulatory
Efforts

Finally, any effort aimed at improving the efficiency of regulatory design
and increasing social welfare-whether it be an offshoot of the ideas contained
in this paper or the meritorious ideas of any number of scholars 2 3 -runs the
risk of going for naught if the results obtained are not measured and evaluated
ex post. 231 Although all regulatory bodies are constantly striving to improve
the ways in which they operate, actual improvement is almost impossible to
achieve unless there is a baseline against which to measure it against.
In this effort, regulatory agencies should be required to perform ex-post
evaluations of their policies, in the hope that the evaluation process itself
would reveal which portions were successful and which were not. 232 In turn,
the agencies could use that knowledge in a continuous quality improvement
effort. They could restructure and reformulate future regulations to seek
oversight process).
230 Scholars have proposed numerous other valuable ideas for regulatory reform over the
years. See e.g. Gary Becker, A Comment on the Conference on Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J.
Leg. Stud. 1149, 1149 (2000) (suggesting that an interest-group competition model would
be a better approach to cost-benefit analysis); Blais, supra n. 40, at 247, 250-53 (arguing
against the neoclassical economic approach to environmental policymaking and for a new
approach incorporating developing economic and behavioral theories); Geistfeld, supra n.
45, at 120-21 (proposing a modified cost-benefit analysis that values safety over money);
Sunstein, supra n. 70, at 1060 (supporting cost-benefit analysis "on grounds associated with
cognitive psychology and behavioral economics," not on economic grounds).
231 See Viscusi, supra n. 22, at 162-63 (criticizing the absence of ex-post evaluation of
cost estimates to discern whether they have systematic deficiencies).
232 See id. (urging the establishment of a policy evaluation staff to make these ex-post
assessments and provide support to analysts outside of the government).
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greater efficiency and increased social welfare. Moreover, the evaluation
process should continue at regular intervals, because we can all learn from
ongoing reexaminations of our past successes and failures in order to improve
upon future decisions.
I.

Interim Observations
The concepts outlined above are not intended as absolute mandates to
successful regulatory oversight policy in the United States, but are suggested
as ideas to help improve overarching regulatory design. Marginal cost-benefit
analysis and risk-risk analysis, in the abstract, are simply tools aimed at
preventing regulations from harming society more than it benefits. Requiring
objective risk calculation would help prevent abuses by powerful forces in
industry or government whose agendas diverge from our nation's best
interests. Correcting systematic risk misperceptions is essential to educate the
public about which regulations are needed and which may be less necessary
than previously thought. Focusing on average risks rather than on worst-case
scenarios will enhance the responsiveness of regulatory efforts to our most
pressing problems. Publishing regulatory triggers and requiring ex-post
evaluations of previously implemented policies should also improve the quality
of regulatory design by exposing it to public scrutiny and continuous efficacy
measurement.
None of these ideas are utopian solutions, however, and some of their
criticisms will be considered infra in Part V. Of course, many of the above
concepts, including the fundamental implementation of cost-benefit analysis,
are far from foreign notions in the regulatory oversight arena. Both the
executive and legislative branches of our government have long debated many
of these ideas, and their attempts to implement sensible regulatory oversight
policies are discussed below.
IV. HISTORY OF REGULATORY REFORM ATTEMPTS

A.

Executive Oversight ofAgency Regulation
Although the legislative mandates given to regulatory agencies generally
have not imposed cost-benefit requirements, the executive branch has made
several attempts over the years to introduce responsible cost-benefit analysis
into the federal health and safety regulation process. President Richard Nixon
233
was the first to recognize explicitly that government regulations cost money.
He established informal "quality of life" reviews, a process aimed at obtaining
some sense of the economic implications of major new regulations passed in

233 See Viscusi

et al., supra n. 2, at 664 (noting that President Nixon instituted a "quality

of life" review process to obtain a sense of the costs and economic implications of major
new regulations).
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the United States. 234 The Ford administration expanded upon this initiative by
issuing Executive Order 11821.235 Ford required that agencies prepare an
inflationary impact statement for major regulations, 236 and pursuant to statute,
his administration established the Council on Wage and Price Stability
("CWPS"), 237 which reviewed these inflationary impact statements. 238 The
CWPS also conducted public hearings to provide public scrutiny of
239
inflationary problems in various sectors of the economy.
President Carter built upon these regulatory reforms by establishing the
Regulatory Analysis Review Group ("RARG"), a body consisting of high-level
Cabinet officials who advised the President on regulatory policy. 240 The
234

Id. For a description of the "quality of life" review process, see Leon Rodriguez,

Student Author, Constitutional and Statutory Limits for Cost-Benefit Analysis Pursuant to
Executive Orders 12291 and 12498, 15 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 505, 512 (1988).
Rodriguez explains:
"Quality of life" review enabled agencies and departments throughout the executive
branch to comment on proposed regulations.... [The review applied] to regulatory
actions that would "impose costs, or negative benefits, to nonfederal sectors" and "that
would increase the demand for federal funds for programs or agencies which are
beyond the funding levels provided for in the most recent budget requests submitted to
the Congress."
Id. (footnotes and citation omitted).
235 See Exec. Or. 11821, 3 C.F.R. 926, 926 (1974) ("Major proposals for.., the
promulgation of regulations or rules by any executive branch agency must be accompanied
by a statement which certifies that the inflationary impact of the proposal has been
evaluated.")
236 See id.

237 See Council on Wage and Price Stability Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (expired 1981)

(codifying Pub. L. No. 93-387, 88 Stat. 750 (1974) as amended).
238 Murray Weidenbaum, Regulatory Process Reform from Ford to Clinton, 20
Regulation: The CATO Rev. of Bus. & Govt. 20, 20 (Winter 1997). The Review Group on
Regulatory Reform, which was a subcommittee of the Domestic Council, provided the
driving force behind this review process. The Review Group concentrated on legislative
and process changes in the regulatory system, and the Domestic Council acted as a policycoordinating mechanism in the Ford White House. Id.
239 See 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1976) (expired 1981).
240 Senior officials in the Office of Management and Budget, the Council of Economic
Advisers, and the White House formed the core of this group, with the Council of Economic
Advisers and the CWPS providing the primary staff support for the group. However, the
President was not bound by the group's advice, as evidenced by a famous case involving the
OSHA cotton dust standard. The head of the Council of Economic Advisors, Charles
Schultze, initially convinced President Carter that the cost of the cotton dust standard far
outweighed the benefits-several hundred thousand dollars for each temporary disability
prevented. Carter, however, came under pressure from labor unions and Secretary of Labor
Donovan, which caused him to reverse his decision and issue the regulation despite its
inefficiencies. This example demonstrates that even when leading economic officials
present a cogent argument on the merit or lack of merit of a particular regulation, political
factors and economic consequences other than costs and benefits can still trump that
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collegial nature of this group served an educational function as well, as
members from different agencies could sit in on debates held in other agencies
and gather expertise transferable to their own work. 24 1 To formalize regulatory
review, Carter issued Executive Order 12044, which replaced Ford's
"Economic Impact Statement" with the "Regulatory Analysis. ' 242 In order to
give the public adequate notice and thereby increase the opportunity for "early

and meaningful public participation," this Order required agencies to "publish
at least semiannually an agenda of significant regulations under development
or review." 243 More notably, it required that government agencies assess the
benefits and costs of their regulatory proposals but stopped short of mandating
that benefits actually exceed costs.244 Still, the introduction of this type of
cost-effectiveness test was a large step in the right direction, leading to the
popularizing of "performance standards" for industry sectors and "bubble

policies" for pollution control.

245

The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 brought executive oversight of
regulatory reform to the forefront, as Reagan made it one of the "four pillars"
of his initial program for economic recovery. 246 He established the Task Force
on Regulatory Relief, a high-level group to oversee the effort and appointed

argument. Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 26-27.
241 See id. at 26.
For instance, EPA officials present during a discussion of a proposed National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration regulation could engage in the debate over the
merits of the regulation and the appropriate means for assessing these merits, where the
same kinds of generic issues were pertinent to their own agency as well.
Id.
242 See Exec. Or. 12044, 3 C.F.R. 152, 154-55 (1978) (describing the requirements
governing "Regulatory Analysis").
243 Id. at 153.
244 See id. at 154. Executive Order 12044 required the following regulatory analysis in
relevant part:
Each regulatory analysis shall contain a succinct statement of the problem; a
description of the major alternative ways of dealing with the problem that were
considered by the agency; an analysis of the economic consequences of each of these
alternatives and a detailed explanation of the reasons for choosing one alternative over
the others.
Id. Thus, although Presidents Ford and Carter encouraged the a cost-benefit standard in
promulgating regulations, the final authority for promulgating rules remained with the
regulating agency. They did not require that an agency actually refrain from promulgating a
regulation whose costs would exceed its benefits. This "advisory nature" of the cost-benefit
standard provides a partial explanation of the limited success of early regulatory reform
efforts as do the inherent limitations on the role of regulatory analyses in rule promulgation.
Weidenbaum, supra n. 238, at 21-22.
245 See Crandall, supra n. 73, at 83-84. "Bubble policies" allowed firms to choose the
most efficient way of reducing total pollution output at their plants, rather than forcing each
individual smokestack to meet a certain standard. Id.
246 Weidenbaum, supra n. 238, at 22.
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Vice President George Bush to chair the group. 247 Stemming from these
priorities, Reagan issued Executive Order 12291 in 1981, the first of its kind to
require that agencies affirmatively demonstrate that the benefits of regulations
exceed their CoStS. 248 That Order stated starkly: "Regulatory action shall not be
undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh
the potential costs to society.

' 249

However, Executive Order 12291 qualified

this bold effort with language exempting agencies from making the costbenefit comparison where it was explicitly prohibited by the governing
statute.

250

Even where there was a contrary legislative mandate, however, the Reagan
administration required that agencies at least calculate costs and benefits and
submit the "Regulatory Impact Analysis" to the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA") within the OMB for review. 25' The role of OMB
became prominent, as it was charged with evaluating the effectiveness of
agency programs, policies, and procedures; assessing competing funding
demands among agencies; and setting funding priorities. 252 The Director of
OMB would review and comment on rulemaking proposals and final rules-

without public comment-before formal publication. 253 Executive Order
12498 further strengthened this review by extending the OMB's oversight role
25 4
even earlier into the regulatory development process.

247 See id.

248 See Exec. Or. 12291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128-29 (1981) (prescribing requirements for
regulations, regulatory impact analyses, and the regulatory review process).
249 Id. at 128.
250 See id. (requiring that the regulation's potential benefits outweigh its potential costs
"to the extent permitted by law"); Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 26 (reiterating that costbenefit analysis is not binding where it conflicts with the agency's legislative mandate).
251 See Exec. Or. 12291, 3 C.F.R. at 128-29 (requiring that the agency prepare such an
analysis, including a description of the potential costs and benefits, in connection with each
major rule, consider the analysis "to the extent permitted by law," and transmit the analysis
and proposed rule to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget); Weidenbaum,
supra n. 238, at 22 (describing the regulatory reviews conducted by the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Office of Management and Budget pursuant to
Executive Order 12291).
252 See Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 27 (asserting that the OMB's responsibility for
setting budgets of regulatory agencies and its substantial authority over the agencies
increased its institutional clout under the Reagan administration).
253 See Exec. Or. 12291, 3 C.F.R. at 129-30 (authorizing the Director of OMB to review
any Regulatory Impact Analysis, notice of proposed rulemaking, or final rule and requiring
an agency to consult with the Director and delay publication of the notice or final rule upon
the Director's request); Rodriguez, supra n. 234, at 506-07 (explaining that the OMB
submits comments to agencies at critical points in the regulatory process, without those
comments becoming part of the record, and that the OMB's recommendations are exempt
from public comment).
254 See Exec. Or. 12498, 3 C.F.R. 323, 323 (1985) (requiring that agencies submit a
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Responsible executive oversight of federal safety regulations was continued
by the Bush and Clinton presidencies with only minor changes. Clinton's
Executive Order 12866 slightly softened the cost-benefit language of Reagan's
executive order. 255 It expressly recognized that not all regulatory benefits and
costs can be quantified easily into a precise number and that nonmonetary
consequences should be influential as well. 256 Such a compromise position
should assuage some of the criticism that cost-benefit analysis is inherently
insensitive to morality concerns and difficult-to-quantify benefits. President
George W. Bush has indicated that he cares about these softer variables as
well, 257 and he has expressed a desire to follow the cost-benefit approach of his
predecessors. Only time will tell what his regulatory oversight policy will
become.
Thus, executive oversight of the regulatory process, from Ford to Carter to
Reagan to Bush to Clinton, has allowed great strides to be taken to improve the
quality and efficiency of federal safety regulations in the United States.

However, full implementation of marginal cost-benefit analysis, risk-risk
analysis (and the other recommendations detailed above) may implicitly
depend upon the reformulation of current congressional mandates to allow for
258
such responsible approaches to regulation.

B.

Proposalsto Rewrite CongressionalMandates
The directives that Congress hands down when promulgating federal safety

statement of the goals and objectives of their regulatory policies and information about all
significant regulatory actions underway or planned to the Director of OMB); Rodriguez,
supra n. 234, at 506-07 (asserting that the OMB gained significant political power through
this requirement, as it was able to comment on regulations at critical points in the regulatory
process).
255 See Exec. Or. 12866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1993) ("Each agency shall assess both the
costs and the benefits of the intended regulation and, recognizing that some costs and
benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.")
256 See id. ("Costs and benefits shall be understood to include both quantifiable measures
(to the fullest extent that these can be usefully estimated) and qualitative measures of costs
and benefits that are difficult to quantify but nevertheless essential to consider."); Viscusi,
supra n. 1, at 1430.
257 George W. Bush has become well-known for his "compassionate conservatism"
mantra. Bush has said that his administration would promulgate "good, balanced
environmental policy, policy that understands you can have economic growth and at the
same time protect the environment, policy that'll base decisions on science, not on some fad
or, you know, politics." Edwin Chen, Arsenic Issue Bungled, Bush Says, L.A. Times A13
(Aug. 11, 2001). Despite Bush's espoused commitment to the environment, he has not
convinced environmental groups, which have already challenged Bush's proposal on arsenic
regulations in drinking water. See supra n. 4 (discussing the arsenic standard controversy).
258 See generally Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 41 (concluding that congressional
mandates have great long-run influence on regulatory policy).
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legislation determine the mission that regulatory agencies must fulfill. These
mandates are often silent on the subject of cost-benefit or risk-risk analysis,
however, and in most instances there are specific provisions that give the
agency the leeway to avoid such explicit balancing. 259 For example, the EPA
was successful in defending against the imposition of a cost-benefit
requirement this year in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations

("American Trucking"),260 precisely because the legislative mandate given to
the agency never required such a sensible analysis. In American Trucking, the
Supreme Court unanimously held that absent express legislative intent to the
contrary, it was not going to "read in" a requirement that the agency conduct a
cost-benefit analysis. 26 1 Some of this concern is undoubtedly justified because
agencies charged with protecting the environment should certainly focus the
majority of their energy on that task rather than on controlling costs. That does
not mean, however, that some element of cost-benefit analysis should not be
included in, or at least permitted by, responsible legislative mandates.
Nonetheless, examples abound of regulatory legislation that is oblivious to
cost-benefit concerns or risk tradeoffs. 262 OSHA's mandate states that the
mission of the agency is "to assure so far as possible every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions. '263 The Supreme
Court elaborated upon this directive in American Textile Manufacturing

Institute v. Donovan,264 holding that OSHA has no duty to base its regulations
on cost-benefit analysis. 265 Similarly, the Clean Air Act charges the EPA with
"protect[ing] and enhanc[ing] the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to
promote the public health and welfare. ' 266 Congress makes no mention of the
cost or risk tradeoffs involved, and the Supreme Court has given no indication
259 See Am. Trucking Assns., 121 S. Ct. 903, 908 (2001) (holding that the Clean Air Act

prohibits consideration of economic feasibility in setting national ambient air quality
standards); Lead Indus. Assn. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding
that the Clean Air Act prohibits consideration of economic and technological feasibility in
setting national ambient air quality standards).
260 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001).
261 Am. Trucking Assns., 121 S. Ct. at 911; but see Chem. Mfrs. Assn. v. EPA, 217 F.3d

861, 867 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (implying a form of cost-benefit analysis through the rubric of
"reasoned decisionmaking "); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 216 F.3d 50, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(requiring reasoned decisionmaking); Stoll, supra n. 136, at 10288 (arguing that "reasoned

decisionmaking" is a back-door method of applying some semblance of a cost-benefit
analysis to EPA regulations).
262 E.g. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994) (defining
OSHA's purpose without requiring a cost-benefit analysis); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
7401-7671 (1994) (establishing the EPA's mandate "to protect and enhance the quality of
the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare").
263 29 U.S.C. § 651.
264 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
265 Id. at 508-12 (1981).
266 42 U.S.C. § 7401.
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that it will force such a comparison absent express legislative intent to do SO. 26 7
Because the current legislative mandates are often indifferent to the notion
of cost-benefit analysis, the goal that government regulatory agencies are

charged with attaining, although noble in intent, is entirely unrealistic.
Nothing-not air, not water, not working conditions-can ever be made
completely safe. Hypothetically, even if it could at some point, the prohibitive
costs required to do so would make it unwise to try. Hence, if we are serious
about efficiently reforming and improving health and safety regulations,
Congress must consider reformulating the current legislative mandates to
268
include the criteria outlined above.

In this vein, several congressional proposals have been put forth in recent

269
years to effectuate responsible and efficient regulatory oversight policy.

House Bill 1022, the Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995,
attempted to achieve this goal by overriding all existing legislative mandates to
require cost-benefit analysis. 270

House Bill 1022 specified that benefits of

regulations be "reasonably identifiable" and "significant. '27 1 With respect to
costs, the bill provided that risk assessment should be "scientifically objective
and unbiased, '272 a provision aimed at avoiding the problem of wide variations
in risk assessment due to political self-interest.273 Moreover, regulators would
267 See Am. Trucking Assns., 121

S.Ct. at 909 (holding that the text of the Clean Air Act

provision authorizing the EPA to set national ambient air quality standards, interpreted in its
statutory and historical context, unambiguously bars cost considerations from the regulatory
process). However, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has insisted that agencies
engage in "reasoned decisionmaking," of which cost-benefit and risk-risk analysis is often
an essential component. See Chem. Mfrs. Assn., 217 F.3d at 867 ("[W]e do not question the

EPA's authority under the Clean Air Act to implement [a certain regulation] if it determines
through reasoned decisionmaking that the program produces environmental health
benefits."); Am. Petroleum Inst., 216 F.3d at 57-58 ("EPA makes no attempt to balance the
costs and benefits of [the regulation], or otherwise to explain why the Clean Water Act
requirements are the real motivation behind [the regulation].").
268 See supra Part III.
269

E.g. S. 981, 105th Cong. § 622 (1997) (requiring cost-benefit assessments for major

regulations); H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. §§ 103-107 ((1995) (requiring risk and substitute-risk
assessments and reports); H.R. 228, 104th Cong. §§ 501-502 (1995) (requiring risk
assessments in Superfund cleanups); S. 333, 104th Cong. § 4 (1995) (requiring risk
assessments for Department of Energy regulations).
270 H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. §§ 103-107. The attempt to override existing legislative
mandates is referred to by some scholars as a "supermandate." Viscusi, supra n. 1, at 1456.
271' H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. § 5(2). The requirement that risks be "significant" can be
traced back to a well-known case about benzene regulations. Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO
v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1980) (holding that OSHA must show that a
substance poses a significant risk to human health before regulating it). In other words, the
regulation must be "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful
employment." Viscusi, supra n. 1, at 1427 (emphasis added).
272H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. § 102(1).
273 This problem was most clearly evidenced by the "Doomsday Rock" calculation, in
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use mean risks instead of the current practice of looking only at worst-case
scenarios. 274 Finally, House Bill 1022 required an evaluation of substitution
risks created by regulations. 275 This bill did not survive to reach the
President's desk, however; it died in Congress in 1995.276
Despite House Bill 1022's attempt to improve the regulatory oversight
process, it possessed serious drawbacks that threatened to undermine its
effectiveness even had it become law. The bill would have implemented a
"peer review program," under which panels of experts and representatives
from government, industry, universities, labor, consumers, and public interest
groups would evaluate proposed regulations. 27 7 Coupled with the bill's
provision for judicial review, 278 such a process would inevitably expose any
regulatory effort to a lengthy delay while the interest groups involved
attempted to make their case. A more palatable alternative for optimal
regulatory oversight legislation might be simply to permit agencies to compare
costs, benefits, and risks. In turn, the agency and the President would be left
with some discretion regarding exactly how far the cost-benefit and risk-risk
comparison would reach. This approach is not perfect, but it at least solves the
dilemma of placing endless regulations under strict peer and judicial scrutiny
prior to their implementation.
Senators Thompson and Levin introduced a second attempt at regulatory
reform in 1997 through Senate Bill 981.279 Senate Bill 981 was not quite as
strict as House Bill 1022 in its risk assessment requirement, as it dropped the
provision overriding all legislative mandates in an effort to seek the political
middle ground. 280 The Senate bill would have required that an analysis of
costs and benefits accompany rules that cost the nation's economy more than
one hundred million dollars annually. 281 It also would have mandated a study
which Dr. Brian Marsden of the Central Bureau for Astronomical Telegrams grossly
overestimated the risk of an asteroid collision with earth. Supra nn. 191-194 and
accompanying text.
274 H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. § 105(l)(B) (requiring "a statement of the reasonable range
of scientific uncertainties"). Using the upper bound estimate of probability when making
risk assessments does not yield accurate calculations, as detailed supra, Part III.F. See
Elizabeth L. Anderson, Scientific Developments in Risk Assessment: Legal Implications, 14
Colum. J. Envtl. L. 411, 411-13 (1989) (arguing for greater accuracy in risk evaluation).
275 H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. § 105(4) (requiring "a statement of any substitution risks to
human health, where information on such risks as been provided to the agency").
276 H.R. 1022 became part of H.R. 9 in 1995, but neither bill survived to become law.
H.R. 9, 104th Cong. §§ 401-461 (1995).
277 H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. at § 301.
278 H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. at § 401 (granting jurisdiction to the appropriate court to
review the "agency's compliance with the requirements of this Act").
279 S. 981, 105th Cong. (1997).
280 Id. at § 622 (limiting the requirement to proposed and final major rules); Freedman,
supra n. 36, at 2075.
28 See S. 981, 105th Cong. § 621(6)(A) (defining a major rule as one that is "likely to
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of the risks addressed by all regulations focused on health, safety and
environmental threats before their implementation. 282 Ironically, although
these provisions seem relatively reasonable, this bill's more moderate position
may have been its ultimate downfall. By attempting to appease everyone, it
became too narrow to excite conservative proponents of comprehensive
regulatory reform and too sweeping for environmental, labor and health
283
groups.
Congress has engaged in other recent attempts at regulatory reform,
including, inter alia, the Regulatory Right to Know Act of 1999,284 the OSHA
Reform Act of 1999,285 the Regulatory Improvement Act of 2000,286 the Truth
in Regulating Act of 2000,287 and the Air Quality Standard Improvement
Act, 288 the last of which would have added a risk assessment and cost-benefit
analysis requirement to the Clean Air Act. 289 All of these bills start with the
same fundamental premise that agencies should construct health and safety
regulations responsibly and efficiently in order to avoid the pitfalls of the past.
As we begin a new century, it is crucial to consider these reform efforts
seriously and implement them responsibly to improve the quality and
efficiency of federal safety regulations. It is common sense that well-meaning
regulatory programs should always do more good than harm, and there is no
reason to shy away from requiring this explicitly in our regulatory oversight
legislation.
Thus, both the executive and legislative branches have made significant
attempts to implement sensible cost-benefit and risk-risk analysis into
responsible federal safety regulation. However, these efforts, while designed
to seek greater efficiency and social welfare, are limited by the silence of
current legislative mandates on cost-benefit analysis and other common sense
principles. Writing these principles directly into the legislative mandates that
Congress hands regulatory agencies may therefore be the key to the future
success of regulatory reform proposals. If the relevant statutory authority were
to require-or at least permit-agency regulators to perform marginal cost-

have an annual effect on the economy of $100,000,000 or more in reasonably quantifiable
costs").
282

Id. at §§ 623, 624.

283 Freedman, supra n. 36, at 2075.
284

S.59, 106th Cong. (1999).

285 H.R. 1192, 106th Cong. (1999).
286 H.R. 3311, 106th Cong. (1999).
2187H.R.

4744, 106th Cong. (2000).

288 S.2362, 106th Cong. (2000).
289 The proposals are too numerous to explore each one independently, but it will be

interesting to track whether any of them dramatically improve the quality and efficiency of
federal safety regulations. Senate Bill 2362, for example, was referred to the Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee last year, but no further action was ever taken on
it, and its sponsor, Senator Voinovich, has not reintroduced it.
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benefit assessments and risk-risk analysis, courts could enforce these principles
consistently. They would be empowered to hold regulatory decisionmakers
accountable in their well-intended efforts to maximize society's overall
welfare.
OtherAttempts at Improving the Regulatory Process

C.

Aside from the executive oversight and legislative reforms discussed above,
some have proposed other ideas to increase the overall social welfare created
by regulatory efforts. These initiatives are worthy of consideration in
formulating the kind of regulatory policy that would serve America best.
Justice Breyer's "Civil Service Elite"
First, Justice Stephen Breyer has suggested that the United States create a
"civil service elite" to address the nation's regulatory oversight problems.2 90
1.

In Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation,291 Justice

Breyer presents an excellent review of the federal regulatory process, its
After detailing the
problems, and its opportunities for improvement.
inefficiency of "the last 10 percent" 292 and the drawbacks of overly
conservative risk assessment,293 he proposes an interesting solution to the
problem of regulatory oversight. Breyer suggests that the best approach would
be to develop a group of "civil service elite" to travel from agency to agency,
learning the workings of each. 294 The members of this civil service corps
would possess and acquire expertise in regulatory analysis issues, including
science and economics. 295 Additionally, this professional group would educate
its members on what worked well versus what did not in each agency.2 96 They
could then apply those lessons learned in new efforts at regulatory reform. At
a minimum, Justice Breyer argues that the civil service elite would be better
positioned than courts--or than current agencies-to make regulatory policy
297
judgments.
290 Breyer, supra n.

20, at 59-8 1.

291 Breyer, supra n. 20.

292 Id. at 11-12 (describing the diminishing marginal returns involved in cleaning up the
toxic waste dump in United States v. Ottati and Goss, 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990) for
nonexistent dirt-eating children); supra nn. 150, 151, 153-158, 220-222 and accompanying
text (discussing Breyer's description of the problem of "the last 10 percent" and the dirteating children in Ottati and Goss).
293 Breyer, supra n. 20, at 10-29 (explaining how government regulation of small but
significant risks often leads to tunnel vision, random agenda selection, and inconsistency
instead of balanced and cost-effective regulation).
294

Id. at 59-81.

at 62.
296 Id. at 66 (envisioning the development of regulatory models by the "civil service
295 Id.

elite" based upon interagency experience).
297 Id. at 59 ("Neither the courts nor Congress seem likely to provide real solutions to the
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Breyer's proposal certainly has merit, and it bears some similarity to that of
President Carter's RARG. 298 The educational function served and expertise
gained by creating these groups certainly has value, but we already have
something much like this today in OIRA within the OMB. 299 Many of the
same individuals have occupied regulatory oversight positions there for
decades and have presumably acquired the expertise to which Breyer refers.
Breyer's "civil service elite" proposal is thus not a bad idea at all, but one
should not view it as a substitute for the more formal reforms outlined
300
above.

2. Regulatory Budgets
Another frequently proposed response to the problem of excessively costly
regulation has been to replace the oversight process with agency regulatory
budgets. 30 1 The idea behind them is to constrain the skyrocketing costs of
government regulation by limiting each agency to a total cost that it could
impose on the American economy. 30 2 The agency task would then be to
30 3
choose regulations that best serve the national interest, subject to this cost.
Although regulatory budgets would impose some fiscal discipline, they raise
serious problems. First, how would society set this cost number? An arbitrary
budget line is not necessarily an efficient or responsible answer in the quest to
maximize social welfare. One must remember that regulators should not mind
if costs go beyond the level at which the initial budget is set, as long as
marginal benefits continue to exceed marginal costs incurred. 3°4 In addition, a

problems of risk regulation."), 75-77 (explaining the advantages of a centralized group of
administrators over more local agencies in addressing regulatory policy problems).
298 See supra nn. 240, 241 and accompanying text (describing President Carter's

Regulatory Analysis Review Group).
299 See supra nn. 251-254 and accompanying text (discussing the increased power over

regulatory affairs enjoyed the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the
Office of Management and Budget beginning in the Reagan administration).
" See supra Part III.
301 Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 41. See generally Julius W. Allen, The Proposalfor a
Federal Regulatory Budget-An Overview, Cong. Research Serv. Rpt. 79-197E 1-24 (1979)
(explaining the regulatory budget concept ); Lance D. Wood, Elliott P. Laws & Barry Breen,
Restraining the Regulators: Legal Perspectives on a Regulatory Budget for Federal
Agencies, 18 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 1-33 (1981) (describing possible forms of the regulatory
budget, pointing out potential constitutional and statutory problems, and suggesting
solutions to solve these problems); Christopher C. DeMuth, Constraining Regulatory
Costs-PartH: The Regulatory Budget, 4 Regulation: AEI J. on Govt. and Socy. 29, 29-43
(Mar.-Apr. 1980) (examining the regulatory budget concept and pointing out its practical
problems).
302 DeMuth, supra n. 301, at 30.
303 Id.

31 See supra fig. 1,Part III.B. Where continued regulatory tightenings result in greater
marginal benefits than costs, social welfare is increased by broadening the scope of the
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regulatory budget would not provide any control over the mix of regulations
that each agency proposes. Thus, a regulatory budget is not a complete
solution, as it is simply an attempt to impose some financial discipline on
regulatory bodies.
V.

CRITICISMS OF REGULATORY REFORM PROPOSALS

Having outlined above several suggestions for improving the efficiency and
quality of federal regulatory oversight policy, 30 5 it would irresponsible not to
address some common-and valid--criticisms faced by these proposals.
A.

Difficulty of Measuring Costs and Benefits

First and foremost, measuring the costs and benefits that result from federal
regulations is not an exact science. The costs imposed and benefits created are
both direct and indirect, and they are often difficult to quantify.30 6 One must
take into account numerous variables and make subjective assessments as to
their relative worth. 307 Furthermore, attempts to assign numerical values to
such "fuzzy" variables are susceptible to manipulation that could hinder or
30 8
defeat the well-intended proposals for improvement detailed above.
Although many observers assume that measuring the direct costs of
regulation is the easier half of cost-benefit analysis, closer examination reveals
that is not always the case. For example, Superfund cleanup costs have
exceeded EPA's original estimates considerably, 30 9 and in the case of OSHA's
controversial cotton dust regulation, the agency seriously misestimated both
the costs and benefits of the regulation. 310 Measurement of these values
becomes even more complex when the subject turns to indirect costs and
substitution risks created, 3 11 both of which are difficult to quantify with
precision. Additionally, the risk assessment process requires a great deal of
regulatory program despite the accompanying costs.
305 Supra Part III.

306 See Blais, supra n. 40, at 246 (noting that natural resources and environmental
amenities do not lend themselves well to trade in a market or measurement in price).
307 See Kornhauser, supra n. 41, at 1040 (discussing the difficulty of valuing people's

preferences and their relative intensities).
308 See Stigler, supra n. 8, at 3-4 (discussing the possibility for interest group capture of
regulatory agencies); cf Smith & Calandrillo, supra n. 8, at 716-18 (explaining the effect of
interest groups on the state mental health institution system).
309 See generally Milton Russell, E. William Colglazier & Mary R. English, Hazardous
Waste Remediation: The Task Ahead (Waste Mgt. & Educ. Inst. 1991).
310 See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilitiesfor Risk
161-77 (Oxford U. Press 1992) (examining the effects of the OSHA cotton dust standard
and concluding that OSHA misestimated its costs and benefits).

"' See Lave, supra n. 17, at 22 (discussing the difficulties of estimating the costs and
effects of regulations); Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, supra n. 18, at 1550-51
(discussing the difficulties of measuring health risks).
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information, much of which may be in the control of the regulated industry
itself, which usually has no incentive to aid regulators. 312 Thus, given the
uncertainty inherent in cost and risk measurement, some scholars assert that
the confident portrayal of risks in terms of dollars-per-death-avoided "do not
'313
so much inform decision-makers and the public as mislead them.
Moreover, with respect to quantifying benefits from a given regulation, how
does one measure the value of a human life saved? Is it ethical to even attempt
to do so? Despite charges that any value-of-life calculation is inherently
immoral, scholars and government agencies alike have indeed devised methods
to make the calculation. 314 Interestingly, when disputes arise, they are
generally not over the morality of making the value-of-life calculation in the
first place, 31 5 but rather, over how large the valuation should be. For instance,
the EPA has argued for a figure of $4.8 to $5.8 million, the Food and Drug
Administration says $3 million, and the Department of Transportation says
$1.5 to $2.7 million. 316 One should immediately note though that even if we
take agency figures at face value, there are still numerous regulatory proposals
that would fail the promulgating agency's own cost-benefit calculation.317
More importantly, the measurement of both costs and benefits may be either
over- or under-inclusive based on one's view of social utility, and may be
biased against hard-to-measure, large-scale projects such as the
environment. 31 8 Thomas McGarity and Cass Sunstein independently argue
32 See McGarity, supra n. 1, at 26 (noting that cynical observers suggest that the

ossification and delay inherent in risk assessment and rule making processes are precisely
what regulatory reformers have in mind).
"I Id. at 24. Moreover, attempts to derive best cost-per-life-saved estimates may "ignore
varying susceptibilities among exposed humans, an omission that may lead risk assessors to
underestimate actual risks." Id. at 27-28. For example, McGarity states that an assessment
of the risks posed by photochemical oxidants should focus specifically upon asthmatics and
not on averages of predicted responses among the general population. Id. at 28.
"' See Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 686-89, 697-99 (detailing the various methods and
formulas used to arrive at value-of-life figures).
35 But c.f Nussbaum, supra n. 40, at 1031. Nussbaum argues that to
assign a monetary value to an option does not.., imply that we have reduced the good
so valued to nothing but the common coin of cash. The fact, for example, that most of
us assign a certain monetary value to our intellectual labor does not mean that we
believe that intellectual labor is just money and has no special qualities of its own.
Id.
316 See Frank & Sunstein, supra n. 189, at 335-36 tbl. 2 (depicting values of life as
calculated by various federal agencies).
317 See Morall, supra n. 122 (suggesting that about half of the twenty-six regulations
surveyed would pass such tests). For example, safety regulations aimed at reducing arsenic
in glass manufacturing, benzene in storage facilities, and radionuclides in Department of
Energy facilities all cost more than $142 million per life saved. See Viscusi et al., supra n.
2, at 700 tbl. 20.4 (depicting the cost per life saved for various regulations).
31 Eric Posner, supra n. 8, at 292-93. David Driesen is also concerned about the use of
cost-benefit analysis in environmental regulations, stating that it "exacerbates tendencies to
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that economic models sometimes dwarf "soft variables" such as emotional
distress and concern for the well-being of endangered species. 319 McGarity
takes this one step further, asserting that "[w]hen information or values arise
that cannot easily be factored into the benefit models, the modelers often
simply ignore them. '320 Including "softer" factors in our social welfare
calculus can help mitigate the under-inclusiveness problem, but then the
discretion of the agency increases and accountability decreases. 32' In fact,
some question whether the benefit gained by modifying cost-benefit analysis to
include these factors is outweighed by the additional complication and
uncertainty introduced. 322 I believe it is, for in order to maximize social
welfare, our cost-benefit calculations must take into account the utility
obtained from traditionally difficult-to-measure variables such as the well323
being of our environment.
With these measurement concerns in mind, even the most ardent supporter
of cost-benefit analysis should acknowledge that quantification of all of the
various values poses a difficult task. In response, Sunstein notes that including
more variables in the equation should improve the accuracy of the
measurement and address some of the critics' concerns. 324 More importantly,
to give up the attempt to measure costs and benefits simply because of the
difficulties presented is to resign society to doing less than its best. Even with
measurement limitations, cost-benefit and risk-risk analysis still bring
significant value and discipline to our search for responsible and efficient
federal safety regulations.
B.

Willingness to Pay Does Not Equal Value

In making these cost-benefit measurement determinations, the traditional
means for calculating benefits is that of on an individual or society's
"willingness to pay" for them. 325 The simplified theory is that the more that

focus myopically on short-term costs to regulated companies, even when imposition of costs
upon them may economically benefit their workers and/or competitors in the short term and
society in the long-term." David Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation:
Beyond Administrative Cost-BenefitAnalysis, 24 Ecology L.Q. 545, 550 (1997).
319McGarity, supra n. 1, at 58; Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the
Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 46 (1995).
320 McGarity, supra n. 1, at 58.
321Eric Posner, supra n. 8, at 293-94.
322 E.g. Richard Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justificationand Comment on

Conference Papers, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 1153, 1161 (2000) (critiquing Sunstein's argument that
cost-benefit analysis undervalues "soft" variables).
323 See supra pt. 11(A) (discussing the various measures of social welfare and the inputs
of the utility calculus).
324See Sunstein, supra n. 70, at 1093.
325See generally Richardson, supra n. 40, at 991 (criticizing the use of willingness to pay
as a measurement standard).
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people are willing to pay to protect against a risk, the more that they value the
benefit received from that risk's reduction or elimination. However, as
Sunstein elaborates, although willingness to pay can be a useful tool with

practical advantages, it has notable flaws. 326 Willingness to pay is often based
on cognitive and motivational distortions and is imperfectly correlated with
utility. 327 Furthermore, people often make different choices as consumers than
they do as public citizens, and it is itself an external value choice to decide
328
which perspective to use.
In addition, utilizing a willingness-to-pay standard raises serious
distributional issues because it is quite different than examining people's
ability to pay. It is intuitively disturbing that a wealthy person's willingness to
pay might vary dramatically from a poor person's, despite a weak correlation
with their respective utility levels attained. 329 On this topic, Amartya Sen
points out that cost-benefit analysis is limited in that it attaches the same value
to everyone's dollar regardless of economic class. 330 Furthermore, cost-benefit
analysis in its most basic form does not positively or negatively weigh the
value of distributional changes. 331 This omission is particularly serious to the
extent that one cares about societal equity, and it is precisely the reason why I
advocate a marginal cost-benefit standard that takes into account people's
preferences for distributional justice and utility obtained from softer
326 See Sunstein, supra n. 70, at 1089-91.
327 See id. at 1090 (describing the inequalities created by virtue of people's disparate
initial levels of wealth); cf Nussbaum, supra n. 40, at 1033 (discussing the problem of
attaching a large cost to options that involve denying citizens rights to which they are
legally entitled). For example, Nussbaum states that it is not always very costly to deprive
citizens of a valuable right to which they are legally entitled. She adds that in terms of
standard willingness-to-pay models, "most U.S. citizens would probably demand only a
small amount of money to forfeit their right to vote at the next local election." Id. at 103334.
328See Sunstein, supra n. 70, at 1090-91 (asserting that it is not clear that choices people
make as consumers should be preferred to choices they make as citizens). Sunstein
recognizes that the
context of citizenship may evoke other-regarding or altruistic values that are not
reflected in private choices. This is partly because aggregating private willingness to
pay can replicate various collective action problems faced in the private domain;
people may be willing to pay more simply because they know that other people are
contributing as well.
Id.
329 Dworkin, supra n. 105, at 197-201 (highlighting the flaws of the willingness-to-pay
standard as a measurement of society's overall welfare through a hypothetical); Sunstein,
supra n. 70, at 1089-90 ("Poor people are willing to pay less than wealthy people simply by
virtue of being poor, and their willingness to pay for something.., is crudely connected
with the utility they would gain from it.").
330 Sen, supra n. 40, at 945-46 (explaining the limitations of the willingness to pay
approach).
331 Id.
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variables. 332
Moreover, as a matter of principle, Richardson argues that federal safety
regulations should be governed by collective decisions, as opposed to reliance
on individual preferences such as willingness to pay. 333 Richardson believes

that cost-benefit analysis may have some use for after-the-fact checking by
courts or oversight committees but argues that it should not be used to make
policy decisions at the outset. 334 Kornhauser adds that one must account for
factors other than individuals' willingness to pay when assessing and deriving
a social value from individual preferences. 335 Moreover, he soundly argues
that our cost-benefit calculation should consider not only the order of people's
preferences, but also their relative intensity. 336 In this manner, one can assign

corresponding values such that individual preferences can be added together in
337
scaled equivalency.
Finally, surveys aimed at calculating costs and benefits evidence a dramatic
difference between what people would be willing to pay to buy out of a certain
risk versus what they would be willing to accept in order to incur such an
incremental risk.338 Studies have shown that willingness to accept is often far
332 See supra Part II.B (discussing various measures of efficiency and social welfare,

including Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, Pareto efficiency, Rawlsianism, and equalitarianism).
People's utility levels are not limited to dollars in their pocket alone. To the extent that
people achieve greater overall welfare levels by virtue of living in an equitable society, there
is no reason for preventing those preferences from entering into the regulatory benefit and
utility calculus. The utility obtained from living in a world where regulations seek to create
a more fair and just society admittedly would be difficult to quantify, but economists can
indeed take such variables into account in their cost-benefit calculus.
"I Richardson, supra n. 40, at 994. Richardson urges us to think about government
decisionmaking in terms of the intelligent formation of joint intentions. He states:
[W]e should view this process as one in which we work together, exercising our
practical intelligence in ways whereby individuals repeatedly adjust their aims and
wants, and demands and concessions, by responding to those of the others with whom
we are negotiating and deliberating, and thereby construct new joint intentions.
Id. On the topic of collective decisionmaking, I note that it is also difficult to obtain
accurate willingness-to-pay numbers for public goods because these valuations are often
skewed by the free rider effect. See e.g. Sen, supra n. 40, at 946.
I" Richardson, supra n. 40, at 974 (asserting that cost-benefit analysis does not provide a
sensible basis for public choice but that such analysis can assist in figuring out the likely
effects of proposed policies).
33' Kornhauser, supra n. 41, at 1040-44.
336 Id. at 1040.
337 Id. Furthermore, whether risks are of a known or unknown probability and whether
the commodity in question is fungible or irreplaceable can also affect whether values should
be assessed based on an ex-ante or ex-post perspective. Id. at 1040-44 (discussing
additional variables affecting the accuracy of willingness-to-pay estimations).
338 E.g. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L.
Rev. 1471, 1483-84 (1998) (detailing the Cornell coffee mug study discussed infra in text
accompanying notes 340-344).
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larger than willingness to pay, though standard economic analysis would have
predicted that rational people would assign the same value to both. 339 For
example, in a famous experiment conducted in a Cornell economics class, half
of the student subjects were given coffee mugs and allowed to trade them with
their colleagues for cash at a later time. 340 Because the initial assignments
were random, the Coase theorem would predict that half of those mugs would
change hands in order to find their way to those who valued them most
highly. 34' However, only fifteen percent of students actually traded their
mugs. 342 More tellingly, those with a mug asked more than two times as much
34 3
to give up their mug as those without a mug offered to pay to obtain one.
Thus, this "endowment effect" and "behavioral economics" reveal problems
344
with survey methods that rely too highly on people's willingness to pay.
These objections are all legitimate, but they only serve to raise the question
of what would be a better alternative. The fact that willingness to pay is not a
perfect tool does not imply that its elimination would be desirable. 345 Absent a
better standard, willingness to pay is the best device for measuring people's
utility levels derived from safety regulations or from any other social good. It
is unlikely that critics of cost-benefit analysis would prefer that regulatory
decisions be based upon interest group preferences or upon uninformed
political judgments. 346 Moreover, as Frank argues, some of the distributional
problems of the willingness-to-pay standard can be overcome by the fact that a
decision not to use it as our measure of utility would necessarily lead to a loss
in overall utility. 347 Frank suggests that the best way to serve the interests of
the poor is to use willingness-to-pay analysis and then redistribute the increase
in overall social welfare to meet society's taste for fairness and equity. Simply

339 E.g. id.
340 Id. at 1483.

31 Id.; see R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1, 15 (1960)
(asserting that the initial assignments of entitlements will not affect the ultimate allocation
of resources so long as transaction costs are zero).
341 Jolls, supra n. 338, at 1484.
343 Id.

34 See id. (stating that behavioral economists have taught us that "people do not equate
opportunity costs and out-of-pocket costs for goods whose values are not solely
exogenously defined ....
[so] those endowed with mugs should be reluctant to part with
them even at prices they would not have considered paying to acquire a mug had they not
received one").
341 See Richard Posner, supra n. 322, at 1158 (pointing out that even critics of costbenefit analysis have not suggested superior alternatives for evaluating public policies and
concluding that cost-benefit analysis is inescapable in a wide range of policy decisions).
346 See id. (expressing doubt that critics of cost-benefit analysis would favor uninformed
policy judgments).
347 Frank, supra n. 103, at 917 (arguing that abandoning cost-benefit analysis is a
gratuitously wasteful way of trying to allocate additional political power to the poor).
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put, if the pie is bigger, everyone can have a bigger slice. 348
C.

Valuation of Extremely Small Changes in Risk-Exposure
Another difficulty with cost-benefit and risk-assessment calculations is that
government agencies are forced to evaluate extremely small probabilities of
any single harm occurring. When one examines a given regulation's effects,
one is analyzing the costs and benefits of creating a relatively minimal change
in the risk to which society is exposed. 349 One should contrast such a
calculation with an analysis of the complete elimination of a given risk. As
Kornhauser asserts, this "change-in-risk" measurement is necessary because
cost-benefit analysis actually evaluates policies that have consequences for the
survival prospects of individuals and not for irreplaceable commodities such as
350
life itself.
Thus, when valuing extremely small changes in risk exposure, the question
presented therefore is not: "How much is a person-or society-willing to pay
to avoid certain death?" Rather, the dilemma posed is: "How much is society
willing to pay to reduce the chance of death from a given carcinogen by one
one-hundredth of one percent?" The answer to the first question would be:
"All the money I have." The answer to the second question is far more
difficult to determine, but this is the answer we need to know in the regulatory
context. Regulators and citizens do not have a great deal of experience making
such small-scale tradeoffs, and thus answers given are likely to be imperfect
and inconsistent. 35' However, society has no choice but to attempt to evaluate
these tradeoffs if it wants to channel its limited public resources into their most
beneficial uses. As regulatory decisionmakers acquire more experience
dealing with minute changes in risk, there is no reason to believe that their
calculations will not improve.
The problem of valuing extremely minimal fluctuations in risks is directly
related to what is sometimes called "survey bias." Contingent valuation
352
surveys are often conducted to answer the kinds of questions posed above.
348 Id. This point is the substance of Kaplow and Shavell's article arguing that society
should choose the legal rule that maximizes efficiency and then use the tax system to
achieve distributional justice goals. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal
System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in RedistributingIncome, 23 J. Leg. Stud. 667

(1994).
341 See Morall, supra n. 122, at 30 (listing various annual risk probabilities that are often
less than one in ten thousand).
350 Kornhauser, supra n. 41, at 1050-51.
"I See id. at 1048 (concluding that "[g]iven this contextual valuation of policies, there is
no reason to expect consistency in the value of life nor to conclude that lives are treated as
ordinary commodities"); Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at 688 (explaining that value-of-life
responses are inconsistent in part because people tend to think in terms of their immediate
resources instead of their lifetime resources).
352 See generally W. Michael Hanemann, Valuing the Environment Through Contingent

Valuation, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 19 (Autumn 1994) (explaining how researchers conduct
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However, as noted previously, assigning values to questions such as "how
much would you pay to decrease your risk of death by one one-hundredth of
one percent?" yields inconsistent results. 353 According to Komhauser,
variation in value-of-life data attributed to government policies ranges from
roughly $100,000 to $5.7 billion. 354 Hence, these surveys indicate that it is
difficult to accurately estimate the values and benefits obtained from reducing
very small risks through federal safety and environmental regulation.
It is not clear that there is a simple solution to these survey problems and to
the measurement of extremely small risk fluctuations. Nevertheless, to the
extent that decision-makers recognize they exist, corresponding valuation
mechanisms can attempt to take them into account. Our calculations can
encompass more variables in order to more closely reflect all of the
components of social welfare. 355 As the public and regulators become better
educated in these areas, it is likely that the quality and accuracy of survey tools
and estimation methods of very minimal risks will improve.
D.

Discountingthe Future

Beyond the issues raised with respect to valuing regulatory costs and
benefits accurately, there is the question of whether the future is worth as much
as today is. Simply put, is an unborn person's life worth as much as a living
person's? What if an environmental regulatory policy would yield a large
impact fifty years from today but have a negligible effect in the short term?
The extent to which we care about future generations has significant
356
implications for the regulations we choose today.
Although there has long been debate about whether regulatory policy should
favor the mitigation of current ills over future ones, the cost-benefit, risk-risk
calculus must account to some degree for the potential suffering of people in
the future. As Frank asserts, failure to adopt more stringent air quality
standards today means that respiratory illnesses will be more common a
generation from now. 357 Cost-benefit analysis admittedly has problems
accounting for future-subject utility, but nonetheless it should and does
discount the benefits of regulation somewhat to reflect the time delay in their

contingent valuation surveys to measure the value people place on environmental
resources).
...
See e.g. Komhauser, supra n. 41, at 1047 (noting the widely varying values of life
attributed to various government policies).
354 Id.

311 See Sunstein, supra n. 70, at 1077 (asserting that a qualitative description of the
variables involved should supplement any bottom-line cost benefit-calculation).
356 See Frank, supra n. 103, at 915-16 (addressing the problem of how to discount future
subjective utility).
311 See id. at 916 ("Having been bom later should not mean that one's enjoyment and
suffering receive less weight in public policy decisions.").
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358

realization.
This practice conforms with the behavior and choices that people make
every day, as individuals generally do attribute a "discounted" rate of return for
their future. 359 Individuals engage in risky behavior like drinking and smoking
because they believe that the immediate benefits outweigh the costs that come
further down the road. 360 Similarly, an immediate regulatory benefit to society
is worth more than a benefit of the same magnitude occurring twenty years
later. However, to the extent that we care about the preferences of our children
and grandchildren, the discount rate might not be negative at all. The kind of
world that they are forced to live in, by virtue of our choices, matters a great
deal. At a certain point, a highly altruistic society might even value the future
more than it does the present.
For example, consider a regulatory program that prevents one case of cancer
today versus one case two decades from now. Assume that each cancer would
cost one hundred thousand dollars to prevent. Under the typical regulatory
cost-benefit analysis, society's discount rate should be zero. In other words,
we should not discount deferred benefits at all and therefore, it does not matter
which case of cancer we choose to avoid. However, from a societal
standpoint, immediate benefits are worth choosing. Wealth levels and
technology are likely to improve in the future, making it less costly to secure
similar benefits than it would have been in years past. Thus, responsible
regulatory policy should discount the future to some extent in its cost-benefit
calculus, though the debate over the amount of discounting is not likely to be
resolved soon.
From a practical perspective, however, this dilemma has not proven to be a
significant source of controversy in regulatory decisions. The OMB requires
that regulatory agencies assess all policy benefits and costs using a ten-percent
interest rate, although agencies are allowed to estimate the present value of
costs and benefits using other rates as well. 361 In practice, most opt to use
alternative discount rates because ten percent is viewed as a fairly high
inflation-adjusted rate of return.3 62 Hence, discounting costs and benefits for
deferred effects has become accepted regulatory policy.

311 See id. Frank asserts that the critics' position "does not argue against the use of costbenefit analysis as a matter of principle. If analysts agree that future experiences should
receive roughly the same weight as current ones, the costs and benefits associated with any
policy change can simply be calculated on that basis." Id.
311 See id. (stating that people put more weight on a present feeling than on a future one).
360 Conversely, many of these same people "invest" in their future by spending resources
on training and education that they hope will pay off down the road. Still, on net, resources
have an opportunity cost, and one must take that opportunity cost into account when
assessing the value of benefit and cost streams over time. See Viscusi et al., supra n. 2, at
670.
361 Id.

362 See id.
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E.

Length of Life Versus Quality of Life
The next problem to tackle in formulating responsible regulatory policy is
the issue of how to value quantity versus quality of life. If EPA regulations
succeed in making the air cleaner only to extend by two years the life of an
elderly person with bad lungs, how much is that worth compared to extending
by two years the life of a thirty year-old with a high quality of life? Two issues
immediately become apparent. First, quantity of life remaining matters.
People are generally willing to pay more to reduce a risk when they are
younger than when they are older, because they have more life left to live.
Second, quality of life remaining matters. A person should be willing to pay
more to have a higher quality of life. These issues occasionally arise in tort
law accident cases, where plaintiffs desire to use "hedonic" value-of-life
calculations to assess their damages. In brief, the argument is that injured
plaintiffs should receive increased damages to reflect the lower quality of life
363
that they will experience for the rest of their lives.
Analogizing to the regulatory oversight context, how does society accurately
take into account the relative worth of saving lives on an absolute basis, versus
the quality of the remaining portion of those lives saved? Is society really
willing to spend the same amount on regulations to save lives regardless of
people's future health, wealth, and living conditions? The Clean Air Act, for
one, makes no distinctions based on these issues, and there has always been
debate about whether it should. An additional problem presented on this topic
is that, depending on the survey in question, studies have shown that it is
subjectively worse to live a life characterized by low quality than it is to be
dead. 364 The logical question becomes: "Would someone really pay more to be
dead than to be alive but with a poor quality of life?" Perhaps the answer is
yes, but that is a bit shocking.
Thus, regulatory decisionmakers must confront the problem of how to value
length versus quality of life. Cost-benefit and risk-risk analysis is certainly not
a panacea to cure the dilemma, but at least they highlight the issue that these
concerns must be accounted for in responsible regulations. True, quality-oflife valuation raises a host of additional questions and is difficult to engage in
with a high level of confidence. Ideally, however, decisionmakers should
factor these concerns into any reform of the federal regulatory oversight
process in order to better reflect society's preferences and increase overall
363 See e.g. Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214

F.3d 1235, 1244 (10th Cir. 2000) (agreeing

with plaintiffs assertion that compensatory earnings based solely on lost earnings will
undercompensate tort victims because life is worth more than the sum of economic
productivity).
11 See generally e.g. Kristen M. Coppola et al., Elderly Adults' Preferencesfor LifeSustaining Treatments: The Role of Impairment, Prognosis and Pain, 23 Death Stud. 617
(1999) (finding an inverse relationship between patients' desire for life-sustaining treatment
and the level of physical pain and cognitive impairment they would experience upon
survival).
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social welfare.
F.

Cost-Benefit Analysis Does Not Help Society Channel Resources into
More Deserving Social Programs

Even if one assumes that a cost-benefit, risk-risk decision criterion would
help eliminate waste and increase overall social welfare, some critics argue

that no vehicle exists for channeling those savings into the most deserving
social programs. 365 Richardson echoes this objection, stating that cost-benefit
analysis does not generate new solutions, resolve conflicts with
366
incommensurable values, or discriminate among closely related alternatives.
He claims that cost-benefit analysis is thus based on incomplete thinking and
reliance on it prevents modifying options and preferences as new information
comes to light.

367

This criticism is crucial, for we have not advanced society's interest in a
meaningful way if the only result of cost-benefit and risk-risk analysis is to
eliminate certain regulatory programs without channeling resources saved into
more productive uses. We must go one step further and affirmatively direct
those resources saved into areas that will benefit more Americans. Low-cost
healthcare and free vaccinations for impoverished children are often cited as
examples of programs where just a little money would go a long way. 368 Thus,

responsible regulatory policy should ensure that programs that offer a
relatively large "bang for the buck" receive the resources that are saved in
other areas. Regulators should not merely eliminate wasteful regulations but
actively seek to direct our limited resources towards the most deserving social
programs.

365 See McGarity, supra n. 1, at 34-35 (arguing that regulated entities are only concerned
with how governmental intervention allocates resources to them). McGarity argues that
absent some government vehicle for directing how regulated entities spend the resources
saved by less stringent regulation, they will devote resources to things that make their
shareholders happy. In defense of this proposition, he states that "in the real world the
strongest advocates of cost-benefit analysis are large corporations, trade associations and
associated think tanks, not exactly entities cut in the mold of Mother Teresa." Id. at 34.
366 See Richardson, supra n. 40, at 987-90.
367 Richardson goes so far as to label cost-benefit analysis "stupid" because, in his view,
it replaces intelligent deliberation-and choice among alternatives-with mechanical
efficiency that prevents the channeling of resources in a socially productive manner. See id.
at 971-73.
368 Cf. David M. Driesen, Should Congress Direct the EPA to Allow Serious Harms to
Public Health to Continue?: NAAQs under the Clean Air Act, 11 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 217, 221
(1998) (describing the opportunity costs of allocating funds to pollution control). Driesen
points out that money not spent on protecting the public from air pollution could, of course,
be used to meet other needs, but that we must be careful that it does not merely lead to more
profits for polluters or slightly cheaper consumer goods. Id.
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Philosophicaland Moral Objections to Cost-Benefit Calculations

Aside from the practical criticisms detailed above, some scholars have
assailed the practice of making cost, benefit, and risk tradeoffs on moral
grounds. Steve Kelman has asserted that the very attempt to place a value on
human life devalues it. 369 David Copp further contends that cost-benefit
analysis is objectionable because it depends on implausible moral theories
about the importance or nature of well-being. 370 More fundamentally, Curtis
Moore objects that "if all the practical obstacles to adopting cost-benefit
analysis are overcome, what remains is the fundamental issue of whether it is
moral for society to take the life of a citizen merely because of the cost. '371 He
argues that the government's "seizure" of rights is not only immoral, unjust,
and unethical, it is "antithetical to the core values of America" and "would lead
inevitably to anarchy. 372
This moral aversion to cost-benefit or risk-risk analysis reflects people's
understandable uneasiness with any kind of explicit human life versus cost
rationing. It is not a pleasant subject to discuss. Unfortunately, the reality is
that if regulators choose to ignore costs, benefits, and risk tradeoffs, or if we
refuse to measure the marginal cost of a human life on the grounds of
immorality, many more lives will be lost. In this context, it is less ethical to
eschew common sense cost and risk comparisons. Given limited resources,
our regulatory policies must do all they can to save the most lives possible. It
would be immoral to do anything less.
H.

Brief Response to the Criticisms of Cost-Benefit Analysis

Thus, it is clear that cost-benefit analysis and the other regulatory oversight
proposals outlined in this Article have inevitable drawbacks. It is crucial to
remember, however, that no regulatory response will ever be perfect.
Statistical tools designed to measure benefits and costs will continue to
improve as they include more variables that people care about.373 Admittedly,
these values are difficult to calculate precisely, but using that as an excuse not
to try is simply choosing to do less than the best we can. Moreover, even if it
is impossible to quantify costs and benefits to everyone's satisfaction, we must
369 Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, 5 Reg.: AEI J. on Govt.
& Socy. 33, 38-40 (Jan.-Feb. 1981).
371 See David Copp, The Justice

and Rationale of Cost Benefit Analysis, 23 Theory &
Dec. 65 (1987); see generally Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, Economic
Analysis and Moral Philosophy 93-99 (Cambridge U. Press 1996); Donald C. Hubin, The
Moral Justification of Benefit/Cost Analysis, 10 Econ. & Phil. 169 (1994).
371 Moore, supra n. 42, at 205-09. Moore adds that "the very essence of cost-benefit
analysis is not only a premise that rights can be alienated, but that they can be-must beseized by the government if their monetary value is too slight." Id. at 205.
372 See id.

373 Sunstein, supra n. 70, at 1077 (asserting that the more variables included in the costbenefit calculus, the more accurate the result).
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still adhere to the abstract principle that benefits to society created by any
federal safety regulation should always exceed harm caused. If we take that
lesson learned and apply it to future regulatory oversight policy, our choices
will better respond to our nation's best interests. Cost-benefit and risk-risk
analysis unquestionably retain significant benefits in this regard despite their
obvious limitations. We must remember that our pursuit is not of perfection
but, rather, of improvement to our nation's overall social welfare.

CONCLUSION

Whatever the future of regulatory reform holds, it is clear that federal health
and safety regulations have yielded awesome benefits to society, but that these
gains have come with staggering CoStS. 3 74 The thrust of this Article is to
advocate a more sensible approach to regulatory oversight policy, with the
hope that we can maximize the benefits and overall social welfare created. In
that vein, we must recognize that scarcity is a simple fact of the human
condition. To have more of a good thing, we must settle for less of another.
Claiming that such tradeoffs are too difficult or too unethical37 to measure
clouds clear thinking about the difficult choices faced by society.
I therefore suggest the implementation of sensible cost-benefit analysis as a
prerequisite to all federal health and safety regulations, and I urge that this
cost-benefit analysis
also take into account the utility that society derives from
376
"softer" variables.

Regulatory policy should improve the lives of the most

people possible and, at a bare minimum, ensure that no regulation harms
society more than it benefits it. Furthermore, regulators should take this costbenefit analysis concept one step further by employing a marginalcost-benefit
analysis. 377 This comparison directly seeks to maximize the amount by which
benefits exceed costs, rather than merely settling for policies that ask only
whether total benefits are greater than total costs in the aggregate. If our goal
is truly to serve our nation's best interests by maximizing overall social
welfare, such a requirement makes sense.
Regulators should also conduct a risk-risk analysis of proposed regulations
to evaluate substitution risks unintentionally created by well-meaning agency
policies. 378 If an FAA directive requires that all toddlers have their own seats
on airplanes-and that causes parents to choose to drive instead (a far riskier
mode of travel)-our well-intended regulatory efforts will result in
counterproductive "solutions." Thus, if the new risks created by a regulation
exceed those eliminated by it, responsible regulation requires a different
371 See Hahn et al., supra n. 2, at 859 (estimating the costs and benefits of various
regulations after the executive orders requiring regulatory impact analyses).
375 See Frank, supra n. 103, at 914.
376 See supra, Part II.B.
377 See supra Part III.B (explaining marginal cost-benefit analysis in detail).
378 See supra Part III.B.
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approach to be taken.
Furthermore, responsible regulation requires objective risk assessments,
absent the influence of regulatory capture. Regulators must work diligently to
prevent abuses by those powerful forces in industry or government whose
agendas diverge from the nation's best interests. In addition, government
should attempt to correct societal risk misperceptions in order to educate the
public as to which regulations are needed and which ones may be less
necessary than previously thought. Moreover, regulatory agencies should
focus on average risks rather than on worst-case scenarios to enhance the
responsiveness of their efforts to solving the most pressing problems. Finally,
requiring these agencies to publish and justify their regulatory triggers and to
perform ex-post evaluations of policies already implemented, should serve to
continuously improve the quality of regulatory design.
Many of these proposals have been suggested previously, and executive
branch oversight of the regulatory process-from Ford to Carter to Reagan to
Clinton-has injected some common sense into the design of federal safety
regulations. 379 Their executive orders have taken the initial steps in
implementing responsible cost, benefit, and risk assessments into regulatory
policy. Problems persist however, in part because statutes governing our
regulatory agencies are often silent on the subject of cost-benefit analysis.
Courts have therefore been powerless to enforce a sensible comparison of costs
and benefits, 380 resulting in regulations that fail to serve society's goals as well
as they could. Thus, sensible regulatory design demands that government
agencies at least consider costs, benefits, and risk tradeoffs in formulating
regulations that efficiently and responsibly maximize society's welfare.
Of course, none of these suggestions for regulatory reform offers a utopian
solution. Marginal cost-benefit analysis and the additional proposals detailed
above have limitations. 381 Critics have attacked the cost-benefit concept from
both a moral and practical measurement standpoint, and admittedly there are
difficulties in its application. However, to ignore the lessons that economics
and common sense teach us about cost, benefit, and risk tradeoffs simply
because of these difficulties is to settle for second best. Society can and will
save far more lives if it is willing to attempt to calculate the marginal cost of
saving those lives.
To this end, we must change the tone of the current dialogue. Instead of
decrying attempts to measure the marginal cost of a human life, we must speak
in terms of maximizing the number of saved lives. The question then is not
how many deaths are acceptable but how to best spend scarce resources to save
311 See supra Part IV.A (describing various executive orders aimed at introducing costbenefit analysis to the regulatory process).
380 E.g. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns., 531 U.S. 457, 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001); see supra

n. 267 and accompanying text (discussing Whitman v. American Trucking Associations).
381 Several of the criticisms of marginal cost-benefit and risk-risk analysis are discussed
supra, Part V.
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lives that would otherwise be lost. From an ethical standpoint, no loss of life is
ever acceptable in order to make money. But, the reality is that in our
everyday economic pursuits, from building cars to manufacturing widgets,
some lives will inevitably be sacrificed. Given this certainty, we must design
responsible regulatory oversight policy in America to focus on how to
maximize the quantity of saved lives that would otherwise be lost.
In this process, I wish to emphasize that a marginal cost-benefit, risk-risk
approach to federal regulatory policy is based on the philosophical
underpinning that doing the greatest good for the greatest number should be
our government's foremost goal.
Although cost-benefit analysis is
controversial and sometimes perceived as right-wing ideology, I view it as an
invaluable tool set in the liberal tradition of helping those whom power and
industry too often exploit. Explicit evaluation of actual risks posed by
environmental threats and analysis of how best to remedy them will prevent
the strong from unfairly pushing their agenda on the weak by virtue of
misinformation or political pressure. The reform of federal regulatory
oversight policy seeks to help as many people as possible, rather than only
those who can lobby for their own narrow interests. We must never forget that
we live in a world of limited resources. If we focus regulatory policies
inefficiently in certain areas because we refuse to employ marginal cost-benefit
and risk-risk analysis, we are by definition diverting resources from areas
where we could better help far more Americans. Even the skeptical reader
would acknowledge that it would be worse to spend $20 million saving one
person's life through a given environmental regulation than to spend that same
$20 million helping thousands of poor women obtain free prenatal childcare
and vaccinations for their newborns.
Thus, the purpose of this Article is to encourage careful thought about where
our limited resources would do the most good when it comes to federal health
and safety regulations. Cost-benefit and risk-risk analysis need not be the only
decision criteria, but they are at least useful tools in identifying policies that
maximize societal well-being more often or better than alternative procedures.
They can and must incorporate social values that seek fairness, equity, and
distributional justice in America. In the final analysis, our ultimate goal should
be to allocate and reallocate our resources where they can do the greatest good
for the greatest number, and we must never settle for regulatory policies that
aspire to do less than that.

